Justified True Belief

(P1) Everything that begins to exist has a cause. Something cannot come into being from nothing.

(P2) The universe began to exist.

(C1) Therefore, the universe has a cause.

(P3) If the universe has a cause, then an uncaused, personal Creator of the universe exists who sans the universe is beginningless, changeless, immaterial, timeless, spaceless, and enormously powerful. Personal: The first state of the universe cannot have a scientific explanation, since there is nothing before it, and therefore, it cannot be accounted for in terms of laws operating on initial conditions. It can only be accounted for in terms of an unembodied mind and his free volitions, a personal explanation.

(P4) The universe has a cause.

(C2) Therefore, an uncaused, personal Creator of the universe exists who sans the universe is beginningless, changeless, immaterial, timeless, spaceless, and enormously powerful.

(P1) Everything that exists has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause. (modest PSR) 17th century Leibniz original Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR): "no fact can be real or existent, no statement true, unless there be a sufficient reason why it is so and not otherwise."

(P2) If the universe has an explanation of its existence, that explanation is grounded in a necessary being.

(P3) The universe exists.

(C1) Therefore, the universe has an explanation of its existence (from P1, P3).

(C2) Therefore, the explanation of the existence of the universe is grounded in a necessary being (from P2, C1).

(C3) Therefore, a necessary being exists (God).

(P1) The fine-tuning of the universe is due to either physical necessity, chance, or design. By "fine-tuning" we mean that the fundamental constants and quantities of nature (e.g., the strength of gravity, the cosmological constant, the distribution of mass-energy in the early universe) fall within an extraordinarily narrow range that permits the existence of physical, interactive life. If these values were even slightly different, no life-permitting universe would exist.

(P2) It is not due to physical necessity or chance. Physical necessity would mean that the constants could not have been otherwise; chance would mean that they just happened to fall in the life-permitting range with no purpose or guiding intelligence. The probabilities involved, and the independence of the constants from the laws of nature themselves, strongly undermine both of these explanations.

(C1) Therefore, it is due to design.

(P1) If God does not exist, the applicability of mathematics to the physical world is just a happy coincidence. On naturalism, mathematical entities (numbers, sets, functions, equations) are non-physical and causally inert. They cannot cause anything in the physical world. So if there is no divine mind ordering reality, the fact that the physical universe behaves in precise accordance with abstract mathematics is, at best, an unexplained coincidence.

(P2) The applicability of mathematics to the physical world is not just a happy coincidence. Mathematics does not merely organize data after the fact; it successfully predicts new phenomena (e.g., planets, radio waves, the Higgs boson) using highly abstract structures (imaginary numbers, higher-dimensional spaces, etc.). As Eugene Wigner put it, the “unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics” is so striking that he called it a “miracle which we neither understand nor deserve.”

(C1) Therefore, God exists.

(P1) If God does not exist, objective moral values and duties do not exist. Without God, there is no objective reference point for right and wrong beyond individual or cultural opinion. On atheistic naturalism, humans are accidental products of blind processes; moral judgments then reduce to subjective preferences or social conventions, not binding truths that hold regardless of what anyone thinks.

(P2) Objective moral values and duties do exist. Our moral experience strongly testifies that some things are really good or evil, right or wrong (e.g., love vs. cruelty, justice vs. child abuse). As surely as we trust our sense experience of the physical world, we trust our moral experience that certain acts are objectively wrong for everyone, always, regardless of opinions or cultures.

(C1) Therefore, God exists.

(P1) If robust naturalism is true, then God or things like God do not exist. Robust naturalism is the view that only physical things exist...no God, no immaterial souls, no abstract minds. Reality is exhausted by space-time, matter/energy, and the laws of nature.

(P2) If God or things like God do not exist, then humanity does not freely think in the libertarian sense. On a purely naturalistic picture, all human thoughts are the result of prior physical causes (e.g., brain chemistry, genetics, environment). This yields at best determinism (or indeterministic randomness), not genuine libertarian freedom to choose between alternatives in our thinking.

(P3) If humanity does not freely think in the libertarian sense, then humanity is never epistemically responsible. To be epistemically responsible...to be genuinely praiseworthy or blameworthy for what we believe...we must have some control over our thinking: we must be able to assess reasons, weigh evidence, and choose between competing beliefs. If our beliefs are entirely fixed by non-rational, prior physical causes, we are not truly responsible for holding them.

(P4) Humanity is occasionally epistemically responsible. In ordinary life we routinely treat people (including ourselves) as genuinely responsible for at least some of their beliefs...e.g., for ignoring evidence, being intellectually dishonest, or carefully weighing arguments. Our practices of rational praise and blame presuppose that people sometimes can freely choose how to respond to reasons.

(C1) Therefore, humanity freely thinks in the libertarian sense. (from P3 and P4, modus tollens)

(C2) Therefore, God or things like God exist. (from P1 and P2 and C1)

(C3) Therefore, robust naturalism is false. (from P1 and C2, modus tollens)

(P5) The biblical account of reality is one possible explanation for the existence of God, things like God, and the libertarian freedom of humanity.

(P6) If the biblical account provides a better explanation of these facts than alternative accounts, then it is reasonable to accept it as the best explanation.

(C4) Therefore, if the biblical account provides the best explanation, it is reasonable to accept it. (from P5 and P6, abduction to the best explanation)

(P1) If naturalism and unguided evolution are both true, then the probability that our cognitive faculties are reliable is low or inscrutable. On naturalism, humans are the result of unguided evolutionary processes aimed at survival and reproduction, not at producing true beliefs as such. Evolution selects for behavior that enhances fitness, whether or not the underlying beliefs are true.

(P2) If the probability that our cognitive faculties are reliable is low or inscrutable, then we have a defeater for trusting the deliverances of those faculties. If you have good reason to doubt that your thinking is generally truth-tracking, then you also have good reason to doubt the beliefs produced by that thinking...including your belief in naturalism and evolution themselves.

(P3) If we have a defeater for trusting our cognitive faculties, then we have a defeater for any belief produced by those faculties, including belief in naturalism and unguided evolution. Belief in naturalism and in the truth of evolutionary theory is itself formed by our cognitive faculties. So if those faculties are undercut, these beliefs are undercut as well.

(P4) Therefore, if naturalism and unguided evolution are both true, we have a defeater for believing that naturalism and unguided evolution are true. (from P1–P3)

(C1) Therefore, naturalism is self-defeating and cannot be rationally affirmed together with unguided evolution.

(P5) Theism offers a better explanation of the reliability of our cognitive faculties than naturalism with unguided evolution. On theism, a rational God creates humans in His image with cognitive faculties designed for truth, not merely for survival. This gives us a positive reason to trust our minds as generally reliable.

(C2) Therefore, the reliability of our cognitive faculties provides evidence in favor of theism over naturalism.

(P1) It is possible that a maximally great being exists. A "maximally great being" is one that has maximal excellence (omnipotence, omniscience, moral perfection, etc.) in every possible world. In other words, if such a being exists, it exists necessarily and cannot fail to exist.

(P2) If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world. In modal logic, "possibly exists" means "exists in at least one possible world" (a complete way reality could have been).

(P3) If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world. By definition, a maximally great being has necessary existence. If such a being exists in any possible world, it must exist in all possible worlds (it cannot be "contingent").

(P4) If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world. The actual world is one of the possible worlds. If a being exists in every possible world, it exists in this one too.

(P5) If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists. If such a being exists in our world, then it simply exists...God is real.

(C1) Therefore, a maximally great being exists.

(P1) Things in the world are in motion (undergoing change). By “motion,” Aquinas means change in a broad sense (e.g., from potential to actual): local motion, growth, decay, heating, cooling, etc. Our everyday experience and all of natural science presuppose that real change occurs.

(P2) Whatever is moved (changed) is moved by another. A thing cannot be actually changing in respect of some feature while remaining purely potential in that same respect, all by itself. For example, a piece of wood does not go from cold to hot by itself; it is heated by something already hot. Change from potentiality to actuality requires something already actual as its cause.

(P3) There cannot be an infinite regress of essentially ordered movers (causes of motion). In a here-and-now (essential) causal series...like a hand moving a stick moving a stone...the intermediate movers have causal power only by being moved/actualized by something prior in the series. If there were no first actualizer in such a series, there would be no motion at all, just as a train of cars cannot move without some engine.

(C1) Therefore, there exists a first unmoved mover: something that causes motion (change) in others without itself being moved (changed) by another in the same way.

(C2) This first unmoved mover is what we call God.

(P1) In the world of sense, we find an order of efficient causes. By an “efficient cause,” Aquinas means that which brings something into being or sustains it (e.g., a builder causing a house, fire causing heat, parents causing a child). Our experience and all of science presuppose that things have causes.

(P2) Nothing can be the efficient cause of itself. If something caused itself to exist, it would have to exist before it existed, which is impossible. A cause must be distinct from its effect at least in the order of explanation: the effect depends on the cause, not vice versa.

(P3) There cannot be an infinite regress of essentially ordered efficient causes. In an essentially ordered series of causes (here-and-now dependence), intermediate causes have causal power only because they receive it from prior causes. If there were no first cause in such a series, there would be no causal activity at all, like a series of gears with no primary driving gear.

(C1) Therefore, there must be a first efficient cause that is not itself caused by anything else.

(C2) This first uncaused cause is what we call God.

(P1) There are contingent beings in the world...things that can exist and can fail to exist. A contingent being is one that does not have to exist; it begins to exist and can cease to exist (e.g., people, animals, stars, planets). We observe that such things come into being and pass away, and so their existence is not necessary.

(P2) If everything were contingent, then at some time nothing would have existed. If every being could fail to exist, then there is no guarantee that something or other would always exist. Given enough “time” or possibilities, there would be a state of affairs in which nothing at all existed.

(P3) If at some time nothing existed, then nothing would exist now. From absolute nothingness, nothing comes. If there were ever a total absence of being, nothing could begin to exist, because there would be nothing with the power to bring anything into existence.

(P4) But something does exist now (including ourselves and the world around us). Our present existence is undeniable. It follows that it cannot be the case that only contingent beings have ever existed.

(C1) Therefore, not all beings are contingent; there must exist at least one necessary being that cannot fail to exist.

(P5) A necessary being either has the cause of its necessity in itself or from another. Either the necessary being’s existence is explained by its own nature (it exists “of itself”), or it is necessary because something else makes it so.

(P6) There cannot be an infinite regress of necessary beings whose necessity is caused by another. An endless chain of beings whose necessary existence is borrowed from earlier beings would never explain why there is any necessary existence at all. There must be a necessary being that has the cause of its necessity in itself and does not derive it from another.

(C2) Therefore, there exists a necessary being that has its necessity in itself and is the cause of the existence of all contingent beings.

(C3) This necessary being is what we call God.

(P1) Among things, we find degrees of perfection (more or less good, true, noble, etc.). We naturally compare things in terms of value and excellence: some actions are better than others; some people are wiser, more just, or more loving than others; some beings have fuller reality or goodness than others (e.g., a rational person vs. a rock).

(P2) Degrees of a quality (like goodness or truth) are understood by comparison to a maximum or standard of that quality. When we say one thing is “hotter” or “colder,” “truer” or “better,” we implicitly measure it against some maximum or fullest instance. Aquinas (drawing on Aristotle) holds that gradations in a transcendental property (goodness, truth, nobility) imply a reference to something that possesses that property fully or maximally.

(P3) Therefore, if there are degrees of goodness, truth, and nobility in things, there must be something that is maximally good, maximally true, and maximally noble. This “maximum” is not just a useful fiction or idealization, but a real standard in terms of which all lesser participations in goodness and truth are measured and made intelligible.

(P4) What is maximally true and good is the cause of all that is true and good in other things. Aquinas argues that in any genus, the maximum is the cause of the others in that genus (e.g., the hottest thing is the cause of heat in other things). By analogy, the supreme source of goodness and truth causes and sustains all finite instances of goodness and truth.

(C1) Therefore, there exists something that is the maximum and source of all perfections such as goodness, truth, and nobility in things.

(C2) This maximally perfect being is what we call God.

(P1) Non-rational things in nature regularly act for an end (toward goals or purposes). Aquinas notes that natural objects and processes...like acorns becoming oak trees, hearts pumping blood, planets following stable paths, and physical laws yielding orderly outcomes...consistently behave in ways that tend toward certain effects rather than others. They exhibit regular, goal-directed behavior.

(P2) Whatever lacks knowledge cannot direct itself to an end unless it is directed by something with knowledge and intelligence. An arrow does not fly toward a target by itself; it is aimed by an archer. Likewise, entities that have no awareness or understanding (e.g., physical particles, plants, organs) cannot by themselves “aim” at ends. Their consistent tendency toward certain outcomes calls for explanation in terms of an ordering intelligence.

(C1) Therefore, natural things that lack knowledge and yet act for an end must be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence.

(C2) This intelligent director of nature is what we call God.

(P1) Fact 1: Jesus’ tomb was discovered empty shortly after His crucifixion. Multiple early, independent sources report that Jesus’ tomb was found empty. The earliest Christian preaching in Jerusalem presupposes that the body was no longer in the grave. Women are presented as the first discoverers of the empty tomb, which is an unlikely fabrication in a first-century Jewish context where female testimony carried low legal weight. In addition, the earliest Jewish polemic (“the disciples stole the body”) presupposes that the tomb was, in fact, empty, rather than still containing Jesus’ corpse.

(P2) Fact 2: Various individuals and groups experienced appearances of Jesus alive after His death. The early creed cited by Paul in 1 Corinthians 15:3–7 (usually dated within a few years of the crucifixion) lists appearances to Peter, the Twelve, more than 500 at one time, James, “all the apostles,” and Paul himself. The Gospels independently attest to appearances in different locations and settings (e.g., in Jerusalem, on the road to Emmaus, by the Sea of Galilee). Critical scholars across the spectrum generally agree that these individuals and groups had real experiences which they took to be encounters with the risen Jesus.

(P3) Fact 3: The original disciples came to be firmly and sincerely convinced that God had raised Jesus bodily from the dead. After Jesus’ crucifixion, the disciples were discouraged, fearful, and in hiding. As first-century Jews, they did not expect a crucified Messiah, nor did they expect an isolated resurrection within history. Yet very soon they began boldly proclaiming that God had raised Jesus from the dead and had exalted Him as Lord. Many of them willingly endured persecution, suffering, and for some, martyrdom, without historical evidence of recanting. In addition, skeptics and opponents such as James (Jesus’ brother) and Paul (a persecutor of Christians) were transformed into convinced proclaimers of the risen Christ.

(P4) No naturalistic hypothesis (conspiracy, apparent death, hallucination, displaced body, or legend) adequately explains these three facts taken together. Through the history of scholarship, a range of naturalistic explanations have been proposed: that the disciples stole the body, that Jesus only appeared to die, that the appearances were hallucinations or visions, that the body was moved or misplaced, or that resurrection stories arose as legend. Each of these theories faces serious difficulties when judged against the empty tomb, the broad pattern of appearances, and the radical, early, resurrection-centered conviction of the disciples. Contemporary specialists rarely defend these hypotheses as fully adequate explanations of the core historical data.

(C) Therefore, the best explanation of the empty tomb, the post-mortem appearances, and the disciples’ sincere, early belief is that God raised Jesus bodily from the dead.

(P1) The New Testament documents are multiple, early, independent, and generally reliable historical sources about Jesus and the earliest Christian movement. On a “maximal data” approach, we do not artificially restrict ourselves to a handful of widely conceded facts; rather, we assess the New Testament writings as we would other ancient historical sources. The Gospels and Acts show: (1) multiple authors drawing on distinct sources and traditions, (2) early composition within living memory of the events, (3) familiarity with first-century Palestinian geography, customs, and politics, and (4) undesigned coincidences between different books that mutually confirm their historical character. This justifies treating them as broadly trustworthy witnesses, not as late, legendary compilations whose details must be discarded in advance. See also: • NT Criticism: Undesigned Coincidences as Evidence of Gospel Reliability • NT Criticism: External Corroboration – Archaeology and Non-Christian Sources • NT Criticism: Early Dating and Eyewitness Proximity of the New Testament

(P2) Taken as generally reliable, these sources support a rich cluster of historical facts about Jesus’ death, burial, empty tomb, and post-mortem appearances. Among the facts supported by the Gospels, Acts, and Paul’s letters are: (a) Jesus’ public ministry, arrest, and condemnation under Pontius Pilate; (b) His brutal scourging and crucifixion, leading to His death; (c) His burial in a specific rock-hewn tomb belonging to Joseph of Arimathea; (d) the discovery of His tomb empty early on the first day of the week by a group of His female followers; (e) multiple, extended, sensory encounters with Jesus alive again, at different times and places, involving different individuals and groups (including meals, conversations, and physical contact); (f) the transformation of the disciples from fearful and despondent to bold public witnesses; and (g) the conversions of prominent skeptics and opponents such as James and Paul, grounded in what they took to be encounters with the risen Christ. See also: • NT Criticism: Internal Marks of Eyewitness Testimony and Verisimilitude • NT Criticism: Convergence of Independent New Testament Traditions • NT Criticism: Transformation and Conduct of the Key Witnesses

(P3) These facts are supported not only by Christian testimony but also by undesigned coincidences, external corroboration, and hostile or neutral sources that confirm key points. Undesigned coincidences...subtle interlocking details between different New Testament documents...show that the authors are independently reporting a shared underlying reality rather than colluding in fiction. For example, incidental details in one Gospel explain obscure statements in another without apparent design. In addition, non-Christian sources (such as Tacitus, Josephus in at least some textual layers, and early hostile traditions) affirm that Jesus was crucified under Pilate, that His followers quickly proclaimed His resurrection, and that the movement spread despite persecution. Jewish polemic presupposes that the tomb was empty, accusing the disciples of stealing the body rather than simply pointing to a known, occupied grave. See also: • NT Criticism: Undesigned Coincidences as Evidence of Gospel Reliability • NT Criticism: External Corroboration – Archaeology and Non-Christian Sources

(P4) No naturalistic explanation (fraud, apparent death, hallucination, displaced body, legend, or any combination thereof) adequately accounts for this broad, interconnected body of evidence when the New Testament is treated with ordinary historical seriousness. When the full range of data is considered...Jesus’ known death by crucifixion, specific tomb burial, empty tomb discovered by named individuals, numerous multi-sensory appearances over forty days, the radical and immediate transformation of the disciples, the conversions of James and Paul, the detailed and realistic character of the narratives, and the deep internal coherence across independent documents...naturalistic theories repeatedly fail. Each tends to explain at best one or two elements while contradicting others or requiring ad hoc additions. A conspiracy cannot plausibly sustain decades of suffering and martyrdom; a swoon does not fit Roman execution practices or inspire worship of a glorified, death-conquering Lord; hallucinations do not produce an empty tomb, coordinated group appearances, and conversions of enemies; displaced body and legend theories conflict with early, structured tradition and eyewitness-rooted testimony. Combining them only multiplies speculative assumptions without yielding a simple, unified account. See also: • Resurrection: Contra Conspiracy Hypothesis (Stolen-Body Theory) • Resurrection: Contra Apparent Death Hypothesis (Swoon Theory) • Resurrection: Contra Hallucination Hypothesis • Resurrection: Contra Displaced Body Hypothesis • Resurrection: Contra Legend Hypothesis

(P5) If God exists and has reason to vindicate Jesus’ claims and mission, then a bodily resurrection fits naturally as a divine action in history and provides a powerful, unified explanation of all the maximal facts. Philosophical arguments for the existence of God (cosmological, teleological, moral, and more) make divine action a live explanatory option. On that background, the hypothesis that God raised Jesus from the dead is not an arbitrary miracle claim but a theologically fitting act: it vindicates Jesus’ messianic claims, confirms His teaching, and inaugurates the new covenant and the hope of final resurrection. This single hypothesis straightforwardly explains the empty tomb, the varied and persistent appearances, the transformation of frightened disciples into bold witnesses, the conversions of skeptics and opponents, and the rise and spread of the early Christian movement centered on the proclamation that “God has Him from the dead.” See also: • Natural Theology Arguments

(C) Therefore, when we consider the maximal range of well-supported historical data and treat the New Testament documents as generally reliable sources, the best explanation is that God raised Jesus bodily from the dead.

(P1) The conspiracy hypothesis claims that the disciples knowingly lied by stealing Jesus’ body and fabricating resurrection appearances. According to this view, the core witnesses to the resurrection did not sincerely believe that God had raised Jesus. Instead, they deliberately removed His corpse from the tomb and then proclaimed that He had risen, inventing stories of appearances they knew were false. The hypothesis thus rests on intentional deception by the earliest Christian leaders about the central claim of their faith.

(P2) First-century Jewish expectations and the disciples’ post-crucifixion condition make such a deliberate resurrection hoax highly implausible. As first-century Jews, the disciples did not expect a crucified and cursed Messiah to be vindicated by resurrection within history. A shameful Roman execution signaled divine rejection, not victory. Their belief in resurrection concerned a general raising of the dead at the end of the age, not an isolated event involving the Messiah. After Jesus’ death, they were discouraged, fearful, and in hiding. Under these conditions, the intentional creation of a radical, theologically novel resurrection hoax is historically and psychologically unlikely.

(P3) The disciples’ sustained willingness to suffer and die for the resurrection message strongly supports their sincerity rather than a conscious lie. From the earliest centuries, Christian sources and external testimony converge in depicting the apostles as facing persecution, imprisonment, hardship, and, in several cases, martyrdom for proclaiming the risen Christ. People will sometimes die for beliefs that are false but sincerely held; it is far more difficult to explain a group of conspirators enduring severe suffering for a claim they themselves invented and knew to be false, especially over many years and across diverse regions, without evidence of recantation that exposes the plot.

(P4) The character of the early resurrection testimony fits honest, sometimes embarrassing witness, not a carefully crafted piece of propaganda. The Gospels and early preaching include numerous features that are awkward or counterproductive if the aim were to promote a calculated hoax: women as the first discoverers of the empty tomb; the cowardice, doubts, and failures of leading disciples (including Peter’s denial); and the slowness of the apostles themselves to believe the resurrection reports. Such elements are more naturally explained as the candid memory of a community preserving what actually happened, rather than as the polished product of a conspiracy seeking power or prestige.

(C) Therefore, the conspiracy / stolen-body hypothesis is not a credible explanation of the empty tomb, the resurrection appearances, or the rise of the disciples’ resurrection-centered faith.

(P1) Given Roman execution practices and Jesus’ recorded condition, survival of crucifixion and burial is historically and medically implausible. Roman soldiers were professional executioners whose duty was to ensure that crucified victims were dead before removal from the cross. Jesus was severely scourged, nailed to the cross, left to asphyxiate, and then pierced in the side, which the Gospel of John reports as producing a flow of blood and water. Even many critical scholars concede that, in light of these factors, Jesus truly died on the cross rather than merely appearing to die.

(P2) Even if Jesus had somehow survived crucifixion, His post-crucifixion condition would not have generated belief in a glorious, victorious resurrection. A man who had barely escaped death by crucifixion would have been gravely wounded, weak, and in need of urgent medical care. Limping out of a tomb, bleeding and traumatized, He would have elicited pity and the hope of recovery, not the conviction that He had conquered death in a transformed, immortal state. The disciples’ proclamation that Jesus was the risen Lord and conqueror of death does not match what a half-dead survivor would reasonably inspire.

(P3) Logistical and environmental factors surrounding Jesus’ burial further undermine the survival scenario. The burial accounts describe Jesus being wrapped in linen, laid in a rock-hewn tomb, and the entrance being closed with a heavy stone. In at least some accounts, guards are posted. A man in Jesus’ condition would have had to regain consciousness unaided, free Himself from grave clothes, move the stone from the inside, possibly evade or overpower guards, and then travel to meet His followers...all without medical treatment, food, or water in a short span of time. This combination of feats strains plausibility given His prior torture and execution.

(P4) Because of these difficulties, the apparent death hypothesis is almost universally rejected by contemporary New Testament historians and medical commentators on crucifixion. While the swoon theory enjoyed some popularity in earlier centuries, modern discussions of Roman crucifixion procedures, combined with historical-critical studies of the passion narratives, have led most scholars...across a broad spectrum of views on the resurrection...to dismiss it as a viable explanation. It is seen as ad hoc, medically implausible, and out of step with what we know about Roman executions and burial practices.

(C) Therefore, the apparent death / swoon hypothesis is not a credible explanation of the empty tomb, the resurrection appearances, or the disciples’ robust belief that Jesus had been bodily raised from the dead.

(P1) The displaced body hypothesis claims that Jesus’ body was moved from the original tomb to another location, leading to an honestly mistaken belief in resurrection. On this view, Jesus was initially placed in a convenient, temporary tomb (such as Joseph of Arimathea’s) and later transferred to a different burial place...perhaps a common grave. When some of Jesus’ followers found the first tomb empty and did not know about the transfer, they concluded that God had raised Him from the dead. The hypothesis thus seeks to explain the empty tomb without fraud or miracle, by appeal to an unpublicized relocation of the corpse.

(P2) Jewish burial customs and the specific details of Jesus’ burial make such a quiet, unofficial relocation unlikely. Jewish burial practice in the first century generally discouraged moving a body after interment, except for transferring remains to a family tomb. The Gospels emphasize that Jesus was buried in a new rock-hewn tomb owned by Joseph of Arimathea, which suggests a deliberate and honorable burial, not an improvised, temporary arrangement. If the intention had been to place Jesus in a common grave for criminals, such a grave was likely already available near the execution site, making a detour through Joseph’s tomb unnecessary and implausible as a mere stopgap.

(P3) If Jesus’ body had been relocated, those responsible (especially Joseph or the authorities) could have easily corrected the disciples’ supposed mistake once resurrection was publicly proclaimed. The early Christian message that “God has raised Jesus” was first preached in Jerusalem, the very city where Jesus had been buried. If the body had simply been moved to another known location, Joseph of Arimathea, Jesus’ family, or the Jewish and Roman authorities could, in principle, have identified the new burial site or produced the body. This would have decisively refuted the resurrection proclamation and undercut the nascent Christian movement. The absence of any such counter-demonstration is difficult to reconcile with a simple, known relocation theory.

(P4) The displaced body hypothesis does not account for the breadth and character of the resurrection appearances and the disciples’ transformed conviction. Even if the body had been moved and the first disciples mistakenly assumed resurrection, this would not explain why multiple individuals and groups...some of them initially skeptical...came to have powerful experiences they took to be encounters with the risen Jesus. Nor does it explain why these experiences led to a stable, bold proclamation of bodily resurrection, rather than to confusion and eventual correction once the true location of the body became known or remained discoverable in the surrounding community.

(P5) Because it is speculative, weakly attested, and fails to explain the core data, the displaced body hypothesis has little support among contemporary resurrection scholars. Modern historical and theological discussions of the resurrection rarely rely on the displaced body theory. It lacks direct textual or archaeological support, conflicts with known burial customs, and leaves the appearance traditions and the disciples’ transformed worldview largely untouched. As a result, it is generally regarded as an ad hoc attempt to preserve a purely natural explanation of the empty tomb rather than as a well-grounded historical hypothesis.

(C) Therefore, the displaced body hypothesis is not a plausible or comprehensive explanation of the empty tomb, the resurrection appearances, or the origin of the early Christian resurrection faith.

(P1) The resurrection appearances exhibit a pattern (multiple, varied, group, and to skeptics) that does not fit what is known about hallucinations or private visions. The earliest sources report that Jesus appeared on multiple occasions, in different locations, to a range of people: individual disciples, small groups, and “more than five hundred” at one time. Some of these were former skeptics or opponents (James, the brother of Jesus, and Paul). Hallucinations and similar visionary experiences are typically private, individual, and idiosyncratic; there is no established psychological parallel to large, coordinated, multi-person experiences of the same figure across diverse contexts.

(P2) Hallucinations or visions by themselves would not naturally lead first-century Jews to proclaim a bodily resurrection with an empty tomb. In the ancient Jewish worldview, visions of the deceased were generally taken as evidence that the person was dead and in the afterlife, not as proof that the person had been bodily raised. At most, private experiences of Jesus after His death could have been interpreted as confirming His vindication in heaven. They would not by themselves explain the strong claim that His grave was empty and that God had already raised Him bodily from the dead within history.

(P3) The hallucination hypothesis fails to explain the empty tomb and the early, unified proclamation of physical resurrection in the very city of Jesus’ execution. Even if one granted that some disciples had subjective experiences of Jesus, this would not remove His body from the grave. The empty tomb tradition is early, multiple, and implied even by Jewish polemic that accuses the disciples of theft. Moreover, the earliest Christian preaching in Jerusalem centrally proclaims that God raised Jesus and that His tomb was empty. A theory limited to hallucinations or visions leaves this physical side of the evidence unexplained or treats it as a later, ad hoc addition.

(P4) Because of these problems, many scholars (including critical ones) acknowledge that simple hallucination theories cannot by themselves account for the core resurrection data. Even some non-Christian or skeptical New Testament scholars admit that the disciples and others had powerful experiences they took to be encounters with the risen Christ, and that the hallucination hypothesis faces serious difficulties in explaining the full pattern. The combination of group appearances, transformation of former skeptics, the role of the empty tomb, and the early, concrete resurrection proclamation makes a pure hallucination theory inadequate for explaining the historical origins of the Easter faith.

(C) Therefore, the hallucination hypothesis is not a satisfactory explanation of the resurrection appearances, the empty tomb, or the disciples’ robust belief that Jesus had been bodily raised from the dead.

(P1) The legend hypothesis claims that resurrection stories gradually developed over time as pious fiction rather than stemming from early eyewitness testimony. According to this view, the earliest followers of Jesus may have had some kind of vague conviction that He was vindicated by God, but detailed accounts of an empty tomb and bodily appearances to many people arose much later as stories were retold and embellished. On this account, the resurrection narratives represent a long process of legendary development rather than reliable early memory of what actually happened.

(P2) Key resurrection traditions (especially the 1 Corinthians 15 creed) are extremely early and rooted in the eyewitness generation, leaving little time for a purely legendary process to create the core claims. Most scholars date the creed Paul quotes in 1 Corinthians 15:3–7 to within a few years of Jesus’ death, drawing on testimony from figures like Peter, James, and the Jerusalem apostles. This early formula already includes the claims that Christ died, was buried, was raised, and appeared to named individuals and groups, including more than five hundred people at once. Such a structured, resurrection-centered tradition so close to the events is difficult to explain if the core resurrection belief were a much later legendary invention.

(P3) The character of the Gospel resurrection narratives shows restraint and proximity to eyewitnesses, not the extravagance typical of late legends and apocryphal stories. Compared to later apocryphal gospels, the canonical resurrection accounts are relatively sober. They lack the outlandish, highly embellished details found in some second-century writings (such as talking crosses or wildly fantastical scenes). The Gospels also preserve numerous “embarrassing” features, like women as the first witnesses, the disciples’ fear and doubt, and the initial unbelief of some followers...features that legendary story-tellers aiming to glorify their heroes would be unlikely to invent. These marks support the claim that the narratives are anchored in genuine early memory rather than free-floating legend.

(P4) The legend hypothesis cannot easily account for the rapid, widespread, and unified proclamation of bodily resurrection in the very first Christian communities. From the earliest documents we possess (such as Paul’s letters), Christians across different cities are already proclaiming the bodily resurrection of Jesus as the central message of the faith. Paul assumes that his audiences have already been taught this and treats it as non-negotiable. This rapid, geographically broad agreement is implausible if the resurrection stories were slowly evolving legends that only emerged after a long period of theological reflection and story growth removed from the eyewitness generation.

(P5) Because the legend hypothesis fits poorly with the early dating and nature of the sources, many scholars...even critical ones...accept the core facts (empty tomb, appearances, early belief) while rejecting a purely legendary origin. A number of non-Christian or skeptical scholars are willing to grant, as historical facts, that the tomb was found empty (by someone), that various individuals and groups had experiences they interpreted as appearances of the risen Jesus, and that the earliest disciples came quickly to believe in His resurrection. They may explain these facts differently, but they generally do not dismiss them as mere legend. This broad acknowledgment reflects the inadequacy of a simple “it’s all legend” approach to the historical data.

(C) Therefore, the legend hypothesis is not an adequate explanation of the origin and content of the early Christian resurrection proclamation.

(P1) Historical documents written within living memory of the events they describe, and drawing on eyewitness testimony, are generally more reliable than late, anonymous legends. In ordinary historical practice, sources that are: (1) Close in time to the events, (2) Connected to identifiable eyewitnesses or close associates, and (3) Embedded in a community that cares about those events, are given greater weight than sources that arise much later, far from the original setting, and with no clear link to witnesses. The shorter the gap between event and record, the less opportunity there is for wholesale legend to displace core historical memory, especially when other knowledgeable parties are still alive to correct falsehoods. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Convergence of Independent New Testament Traditions • CE / NT Criticism: Internal Marks of Eyewitness Testimony and Verisimilitude

(P2) Key New Testament writings (especially Paul’s letters, the Gospels, and Acts) are best dated to within a few decades of Jesus’ death, squarely within the lifetime of eyewitnesses and contemporaries. Multiple lines of mainstream scholarship...across a wide spectrum of views...support relatively early dates for major New Testament documents: (1) Paul’s undisputed letters (c. AD 48–60). 1 Corinthians, Galatians, 1 Thessalonians, Romans, and others are widely dated to the 50s AD, roughly 20–30 years after Jesus’ crucifixion (c. AD 30). In 1 Corinthians 15:3–7, Paul quotes a pre-existing creed about Jesus’ death, burial, resurrection, and appearances that most scholars date to within a few years of the events it describes. (2) Acts likely before the mid-60s AD. Acts ends with Paul alive and under house arrest in Rome, with no mention of his trial or death (c. mid-60s), the deaths of Peter and James, or the destruction of the Jerusalem Temple in AD 70. The most natural explanation is that Acts was written before these major events, placing it in the early-to-mid 60s. (3) Luke before Acts, Mark and Matthew earlier still. Since Acts is the sequel to Luke (Acts 1:1–2), Luke must be earlier than Acts. Many scholars date Luke to the 60s, with Mark and Matthew in the 50s–60s. This puts at least one and probably multiple Gospels within 30–40 years of the crucifixion, when many eyewitnesses and contemporaries were still alive. (4) John within living memory as well. Even relatively later datings for John (e.g., 80s–90s AD) still place it within the lifetime of at least some eyewitnesses and second-generation disciples. And there are good reasons, argued by some scholars, for considering an earlier date for John as well. These timeframes are well within what historians normally consider compatible with serious, historically grounded biography...especially in an oral culture that valued memorization and communal transmission. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: External Corroboration – Archaeology and Non-Christian Sources • CE / NT Criticism: Undesigned Coincidences as Evidence of Gospel Reliability

(P3) The New Testament writings explicitly and implicitly claim close contact with eyewitnesses and early participants in the events they narrate. (1) Luke’s explicit method statement. Luke begins by noting that he has followed all things “closely for some time past” and that his account is based on “those who from the beginning were eyewitnesses and ministers of the word” (Luke 1:1–4). This is exactly the kind of historian’s preface we find in other ancient historical works. (2) John’s claim to eyewitness testimony. The Fourth Gospel grounds its narrative in the testimony of the “disciple whom Jesus loved” (John 21:24), indicating that the author is either this eyewitness or closely dependent on him: “This is the disciple who is bearing witness about these things, and who has written these things, and we know that his testimony is true.” (3) Acts’ “we” sections and proximity to Paul. Acts shifts into first-person plural (“we”) in several travel narratives (e.g., Acts 16:10–17; 20:5–15; 21:1–18; 27:1–28:16), strongly suggesting that the author was a traveling companion of Paul for parts of his ministry. This gives Acts direct access to an apostolic eyewitness and his circle. (4) Paul’s personal acquaintance with other eyewitnesses. In Galatians 1–2 and 1 Corinthians 15, Paul notes that he met Peter (Cephas), James, and other apostles, and that he received and passed on tradition that was already established in the Jerusalem church. He emphasizes that he is not preaching a message invented in isolation, but one consistent with those “who were apostles before me” (Galatians 1:17). (5) Early external testimony (e.g., Papias, Irenaeus). Early Christian writers like Papias and Irenaeus report that Mark wrote down Peter’s preaching and that Matthew compiled sayings or a Gospel in the “Hebrew dialect.” While details are debated, this tradition supports a close connection between the canonical Gospels and the apostolic eyewitness circle. Taken together, these internal and external indications present the New Testament authors not as distant, anonymous compilers, but as individuals personally connected to eyewitnesses or being eyewitnesses themselves. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Literary/Historical Character of the Gospels • CE / NT Criticism: Convergence of Independent New Testament Traditions

(P4) Late, anonymous, and legendary gospels stand in sharp contrast to the canonical Gospels, both in date and in historical character, and therefore do not undermine the early and eyewitness-based nature of the New Testament accounts. (1) Apocryphal gospels generally arise in the 2nd century or later. Documents such as the Gospel of Thomas, Gospel of Peter, Gospel of Judas, and others typically date to well after the first century...often 100–200 years after Jesus. They emerge from later theological movements (e.g., Gnosticism) rather than from the original Palestinian context. (2) Their style and content are markedly different. These later writings tend to lack the dense geographical, political, and cultural specificity found in the canonical Gospels. They often present Jesus delivering abstract, esoteric sayings or performing fantastical, unhistorical miracles, with little concern for realistic narrative setting. (3) Early Christians did not “suppress” equal competitors. The earliest church fathers, when they discuss the four canonical Gospels, treat them as long-established and widely used. The later apocryphal writings are often explicitly rejected or ignored. The pattern is not of powerful bishops excluding rival early accounts, but of the church recognizing, and continuing to use, the earliest texts connected to apostles and their close associates. Thus, appeals to “other gospels” do not weaken the case for early, eyewitness-connected canonical Gospels; they actually highlight how different the canonical four are from the genuinely late and legendary material. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Canonical Gospels vs. Apocryphal Gospels • CE / NT Criticism: Undesigned Coincidences as Evidence of Gospel Reliability

(P5) Given their early dates and close connection to eyewitnesses, the New Testament documents deserve a presumption of historical reliability, especially regarding central events like Jesus’ ministry, crucifixion, burial, and post-mortem appearances. When the major New Testament writings are: (1) Written within living memory of the events, (2) Produced by or in close contact with eyewitnesses, (3) Internally coherent and realistic, and (4) Supported by undesigned coincidences and external corroboration, the burden of proof shifts. Skeptics cannot simply dismiss them as “late legends” or “anonymous myths.” Instead, they must offer careful, evidence-based reasons to override the strong initial presumption that such sources are at least broadly reliable historical witnesses. This presumption does not require believing that every minor detail is beyond question. It does, however, justify trusting their main lines of testimony...particularly about Jesus’ public ministry, His crucifixion under Pontius Pilate, and the experiences that His earliest followers interpreted as encounters with the risen Christ. See also: • CE / Resurrection: Minimal Facts Argument • CE / Resurrection: Maximal Facts Argument

(C) Therefore, the early dating and eyewitness proximity of the New Testament writings strongly support their general historical reliability and undercut skeptical claims that they are late, legendary, or detached from the real Jesus of history.

(P1) Undesigned coincidences are subtle, interlocking details between independent accounts that fit together in a natural way, best explained if the authors are reporting real events. An “undesigned coincidence” occurs when one document mentions a detail that raises a natural question, and another document...without apparent design to answer it...provides just the right incidental information that makes sense of the first. The fit is too casual and unforced to look like copying or collusion. Such patterns are exactly what we expect if multiple witnesses (or those drawing on witnesses) are independently describing the same real events from different angles. Examples include: (1) One Gospel mentioning an event or saying without explanation, while another quietly supplies the background that makes it intelligible. (2) Acts explaining personal details about a character that clarify brief remarks in Paul’s letters, and vice versa. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Internal Marks of Eyewitness Testimony and Verisimilitude • CE / NT Criticism: Convergence of Independent New Testament Traditions

(P2) The Gospels and Acts contain numerous and varied undesigned coincidences, both among themselves and with Paul’s letters, which strongly indicate independent access to a shared historical reality. Across the New Testament, we find many instances where one book casually illuminates another: (1) John mentions Jesus asking Philip where to buy bread (John 6:5), but gives no reason. Luke earlier notes that Philip is from Bethsaida (John 1:44), the very region where the feeding of the five thousand takes place (Luke 9:10), explaining why Jesus would ask Philip in particular. (2) Mark notes that many were “coming and going” so that the disciples had no leisure even to eat (Mark 6:31), but does not say why Galilee would be unusually crowded. John explains that “the Passover, the feast of the Jews, was at hand” (John 6:4), naturally accounting for the influx of people. (3) Acts mentions that the proconsul Sergius Paulus believed after Paul’s miracle on Cyprus (Acts 13:7–12). Inscriptions and other evidence independently confirm the historical existence of a Lucius Sergius Paulus as a Roman official, matching the sort of incidental realism we find in undesigned coincidences. (4) Multiple examples link the Gospels with Acts and with Paul’s letters: personal names, travel plans, local customs, and offhand remarks in one text that are neatly clarified in another, without any sign of deliberate harmonization. These patterns are cumulative and cross-cut different authors (e.g., John with the Synoptics, Acts with Paul), reinforcing the conclusion that we are dealing with overlapping, historically grounded testimony, not a single late literary construction. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: External Corroboration – Archaeology and Non-Christian Sources • CE / NT Criticism: Early Dating and Eyewitness Proximity of the New Testament

(P3) Fiction, collusion, or late legendary development are unlikely to produce this pattern of casual, cross-document fit, especially when the details often appear minor or even theologically irrelevant. If the Gospel writers and other New Testament authors were inventing stories or freely reshaping traditions, we would expect: (1) Either obvious literary artistry that draws attention to the connections, or (2) Contrived harmonization where one author clearly borrows another’s distinctive details in a heavy-handed way. Instead, many coincidences are: (1) Quiet and easily overlooked, suggesting the authors were not trying to engineer them. (2) Involving incidental details (geography, names, offhand motives) that serve no clear theological agenda but fit like pieces of a puzzle when texts are compared. (3) Spread across works traditionally linked to different lines of transmission (e.g., Johannine vs. Synoptic; Pauline letters vs. Acts), making coordinated fabrication increasingly implausible. A forger or late legendary redactor would have little reason to plant dozens of subtle, easily-missed interlocks that only emerge when texts are read side by side with historical attention. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Canonical Gospels vs. Apocryphal Gospels • CE / NT Criticism: Literary/Historical Character of the Gospels

(P4) Therefore, the presence of many undesigned coincidences across the New Testament provides strong, positive evidence that the Gospel and Acts narratives are rooted in truthful, historically reliable testimony rather than in late legend or theological fiction. Undesigned coincidences function like independent lines of cross-examination in a courtroom: separate witnesses, with different emphases and memories, nonetheless “fit” together in ways best explained if they are each in contact with the same set of real events. This pattern: (1) Undermines skeptical claims that the Gospels are late, derivative, and largely legendary. (2) Supports treating the New Testament as broadly trustworthy when it reports events, settings, and persons. (3) Lends particular credibility to the central claims...such as the crucifixion, burial, empty tomb, and post-resurrection appearances...for which we see similar interlocking patterns. Thus, undesigned coincidences undergird a maximal-data approach to the resurrection by strengthening the case that the New Testament writers are sober, informed witnesses rather than theological novelists. See also: • CE / Resurrection: Maximal Facts Argument • CE / Resurrection: Three Facts Argument

(C) Therefore, undesigned coincidences across the New Testament are best explained if the Gospels and Acts are generally reliable historical documents grounded in real events and genuine eyewitness (or close-up) testimony.

(P1) TBD. TBD.

(C2) TBD.

(●) First principles in logic are the most basic foundational rules or assumptions upon which logical reasoning is built. These principles are considered self-evident and do not require proof within the system...they are the starting points for all logical arguments and deductions. The most commonly recognized first principles in classical logic are:

(●) The Law of Identity: Everything is identical to itself. Any object or statement is the same as itself. A=A "For the same thing to belong and not belong simultaneously to the same thing and in the same respect is impossible..." -Aristotle

(●) The Law of Non-Contradiction: A statement cannot be both true and false at the same time and in the same respect. This means that "A and not A" cannot both be true. ¬(A ∧ ¬A) "It is impossible for the same thing at the same time to belong and not to belong to the same thing and in the same respect." -Aristotle

(●) The Law of Excluded Middle: For any proposition, either that proposition is true, or its negation is true. This means that there is no third (middle) option between a statement being true or false. A ∨ ¬A "But on the other hand, there cannot be an intermediate between contradictories, but of one subject we must either affirm or deny any one predicate." -Aristotle

(●) What Are Deductive Arguments?
Deductive arguments are a fundamental part of logical reasoning. In a deductive argument, the conclusion is intended to follow necessarily from the premises. This means that if the premises are true and the reasoning is valid, the conclusion must also be true.

(●) Key Features of Deductive Arguments

- Certainty: Deductive arguments aim for certainty, not just probability. If the logic is valid and the premises are true, the conclusion cannot be false.
- Validity: An argument is valid if the conclusion logically follows from the premises, regardless of whether the premises are actually true.
- Soundness: An argument is sound if it is valid and all its premises are actually true.

(●) Multiple Premises in Deductive Arguments
Unlike syllogisms, which always have exactly two premises, deductive arguments can have any number of premises. For example, a mathematical proof might use several established facts (premises) to reach a conclusion. The key is that the conclusion must logically follow from all the premises taken together.

Example with Multiple Premises:

(P1) All mammals are warm-blooded.
(P2) All whales are mammals.
(P3) All warm-blooded animals need oxygen.
(C) Therefore, all whales need oxygen.
Here, three premises are used to reach the conclusion.

So how are Syllogisms different? What Is a Syllogism?
A syllogism is a special kind of deductive argument with a very specific structure. First formalized by Aristotle, syllogisms have been a foundation of logical thinking for centuries. They are designed to show how a conclusion necessarily follows from two premises.

The Structure of a Syllogism
A standard (categorical) syllogism consists of:

-Major premise: A general statement about a group or category.
-Minor premise: A statement about a specific member or subset of that group.
-Conclusion: A statement that follows from the two premises.

Each statement contains two of three terms:

-Major term: The predicate of the conclusion.
-Minor term: The subject of the conclusion.
-Middle term: The term that links the major and minor terms, appearing in both premises but not in the conclusion.

Example (Categorical Syllogism):
-All mammals are warm-blooded. (major premise)
-All whales are mammals. (minor premise)
-Therefore, all whales are warm-blooded. (conclusion)

-Major term: warm-blooded
-Minor term: whales
-Middle term: mammals

Rules of Syllogisms
To be valid, a syllogism must follow certain rules:
-It must have exactly three terms, each used consistently.
-The middle term must be distributed (refer to all members of its class) at least once.
-No term can be distributed in the conclusion unless it was distributed in the premises.
-It cannot have two negative premises.
-If a premise is negative, the conclusion must also be negative.
-No conclusion can be drawn from two particular premises.

(●) Types of Deductive Arguments
Deductive arguments come in several forms, each with its own rules and applications. Here are the main types:

1. Categorical Deductive Arguments
These use statements about categories or classes, such as "All A are B." Syllogisms are the classic example of categorical arguments, focusing on relationships between groups or sets.

Example:
All birds have feathers.
All robins are birds.
Therefore, all robins have feathers.

2. Propositional Deductive Arguments
These use logical connectives to relate whole statements (propositions), such as "and," "or," and "if...then." Common forms within propositional logic include:

- Modus Ponens:
If P, then Q.
P.
Therefore, Q.

- Modus Tollens:
If P, then Q.
Not Q.
Therefore, not P.

- Disjunctive Syllogism:
P or Q.
Not P.
Therefore, Q.
(Disjunctive arguments use "either...or" statements and are a subtype of propositional logic.)

- Hypothetical Syllogism:
If P, then Q.
If Q, then R.
Therefore, if P, then R.
(Hypothetical arguments use conditional "if...then" statements and are also a subtype of propositional logic.)

3. Modal Deductive Arguments
These involve concepts of necessity and possibility, using modal operators like "necessarily" and "possibly."

Example:
Necessarily, if it is a square, then it is a rectangle.
It is a square.
Therefore, it is necessarily a rectangle.

4. Mathematical Deductive Arguments
These use axioms, definitions, and theorems to reach conclusions. Mathematical arguments often employ both categorical and propositional logic, but are structured around mathematical principles.

Example:
A triangle has three sides.
Figure X is a triangle.
Therefore, Figure X has three sides.

(●) Why Are Deductive Arguments Important?
Deductive arguments are used in mathematics, science, law, computer science, and everyday reasoning. They help us build strong, reliable conclusions from established facts or principles. Understanding deductive arguments helps you think more clearly, spot errors in reasoning, and communicate your ideas more effectively.

(●) What is Inductive Reasoning?
In an inductive argument, it's possible for the premises to be true and the conclusion still be false. The premises don't guarantee the conclusion, but instead make it more probable than its competitors. The evidence used "underdetermines" the conclusion, meaning it makes it likely or plausible, but not certain. A good inductive argument must have true premises that are more plausible than their contradictories, and be informally valid (avoiding fallacies). However, they are not assessed for formal validity because the premises don't necessitate the conclusion's truth.

Here's a key example:
- 1. Groups A, B, and C were similar people with the same disease.
- 2. Group A got a new drug, B got a placebo, C got no treatment.
- 3. Death rate was 75% lower in Group A than B and C.
- 4. Therefore, the new drug is effective.

The conclusion is likely true based on the evidence, but it's not guaranteed – perhaps luck or another factor caused the difference.

(●) How Do We Understand Inductive Reasoning?
Philosophers approach understanding inductive reasoning in different ways. Two prominent methods are:

1. Bayes's Theorem:
This approach uses the rules of probability calculus. Bayes's theorem provides formulas to calculate the probability of a hypothesis (H) given certain evidence (E), symbolized as Pr(H|E). Probabilities range from 0 (lowest) to 1 (highest), with values above 0.5 suggesting positive probability. The probability of a hypothesis given evidence depends on its intrinsic probability (its likelihood based on general background knowledge) and its explanatory power (how likely the evidence would be if the hypothesis were true). A challenge in philosophy is assigning precise numerical values to these probabilities, often relying on vague approximations. An "odds form" of the theorem can compare the probability of two competing hypotheses given the evidence.

2. Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE)
A perhaps more practically useful approach in philosophy is inference to the best explanation (Also sometimes called Abduction). This method involves starting with data that needs explaining, identifying a set of possible explanations ("a pool of live options"), and then selecting the explanation that, if true, would best explain the data. Several criteria are commonly used to determine which explanation is "best":

• Explanatory scope: Does it explain a wider range of data than rivals?
• Explanatory power: Does it make the observable data more likely than rivals?
• Plausibility: Is it implied by a greater variety of accepted truths and its negation by fewer?
• Less ad hoc: Does it involve fewer new, unsupported assumptions than rivals?
• Accord with accepted beliefs: When combined with accepted truths, does it imply fewer falsehoods than rivals?
• Comparative superiority: Does it significantly outperform its rivals across these criteria?

The neo-Darwinian theory of biological evolution is presented as a good example of IBE. Supporters argue that even though the evidence (like micro-evolutionary change) doesn't prove macro-evolutionary development, the theory is the best explanation for the data due to its scope, power, and other factors. Critics, however, argue that the perceived superiority of Darwinism only holds if the pool of possible explanations is artificially limited (e.g., to only naturalistic ones). If other hypotheses, such as intelligent design, are allowed, the picture changes. This debate itself illustrates how IBE works and how disagreements about the criteria or the pool of options can arise.

(●) Symbolic logic is a subdiscipline of philosophy akin to mathematics that deals with the rules of reasoning. In symbolic logic, letters and symbols are used to stand for sentences and the words that connect them. This approach helps to make the logical form of a sentence clear without being distracted by its grammatical form, as sentences with different grammatical structures may still have the same logical form.

Here is a legend of some common symbols:

Letters (P, Q, R, S, etc.)
Meaning: These capital letters stand for any arbitrary sentences.
Example: In the argument "If today is Sunday, the library is closed. Today is Sunday. Therefore, the library is closed," we can let P = "Today is Sunday" and Q = "the library is closed".

Arrow (→)
Meaning: The arrow stands for the connecting words, "if . . . , then . . ." or it can be read as "implies". In a sentence of the form P → Q, P is the antecedent clause and states a sufficient condition of the consequent clause Q. Q is the consequent clause and states a necessary condition of the antecedent clause P. The clause that follows a simple "if" is symbolized P (sufficient condition), and the clause that follows "only if" is symbolized Q (necessary condition).
Example: The sentence "If John studies hard, then he will get a good grade in logic" can be symbolized as P → Q, where P = "John studies hard" and Q = "he will get a good grade in logic". The sentence "Extra credit will be permitted only if you have completed all the required work" can be symbolized as P → Q, where P = "You may do extra credit work" and Q = "You have completed the required work".

Negation (¬)
Meaning: This symbol stands for "not" and is the sign of negation.
Example: ¬Q is read as "Not-Q". If Q is the sentence "My roommate is sleeping in," then ¬Q is "My roommate is not sleeping in". ¬¬Q is logically equivalent to Q.

Conjunction (&)
Meaning: This symbol is read as "and". It symbolizes any conjunction, including words like but, while, although, whereas, and many other words when they function as conjunctions. For a conjunction P & Q to be true, both P and Q must be true.
Example: The sentence "Charity is playing the piano, and Jimmy is trying to play the piano" can be symbolized as P & Q, where P = "Charity is playing the piano" and Q = "Jimmy is trying to play the piano". The sentence "They ate their spinach, even though they didn’t like it" would be symbolized P & Q, where P symbolizes "They ate their spinach" and Q symbolizes "they didn’t like it".

Disjunction (v)
Meaning: This symbol is read as "or". A sentence composed of two sentences connected by "or" is called a disjunction. In order for a disjunction to be true, only one part has to be true (or both).
Example: The sentence "Either Mallory will carefully work on decorating their new apartment, or she will allow it to degenerate into a pigsty" can be symbolized as P v Q, where P = "Mallory will carefully work on decorating their new apartment" and Q = "she will allow it to degenerate into a pigsty". Note that in logic, both parts of a disjunction can be true.

Universal Quantification ((x))
Meaning: This symbol is used in first-order predicate logic to deal with quantified sentences, specifically those about all or none of a group. It can be read as "For any x, . . .". Universally quantified statements turn out to be disguised "if . . . , then . . ." statements. The variable 'x' can be replaced by any individual thing.
Example: The statement "All bears are mammals" can be symbolized as (x) (Bx → Mx), where Bx = "x is a bear" and Mx = "x is a mammal". This is read as "For any x, if x is a bear, then x is a mammal". A negative universal statement like "No goose is hairy" is symbolized by negating the consequent: (x) (Gx → ¬Hx), read as "For any x, if x is a goose, then x is not hairy".

Existential Quantification (∃x)
Meaning: This symbol is used in first-order predicate logic for statements about only some members of a group. It tells us that there really exists at least one thing that has the property in question. It may be read as "There is at least one ___ such that . . .". Existentially quantified statements are typically symbolized using & (conjunction), not → (conditional).
Example: The statement "Some bears are white" can be symbolized as (∃x) (Bx & Wx), where Bx = "x is a bear" and Wx = "x is white". This is read as "There is at least one x such that x is a bear and x is white". The statement "Some bears are not white" is symbolized as (∃x) (Bx & ¬Wx).

Necessity (□)
Meaning: This symbol is used in modal logic to stand for the mode of necessity. □P is read as "Necessarily, P" and indicates that the statement P is necessarily true (true in every possible world). □¬P indicates that P is necessarily false (false in every possible world).
Example: □P is read as "Necessarily, P". □¬P is read as "Necessarily, not-P".

Possibility (◊)
Meaning: This symbol is used in modal logic to stand for the mode of possibility. ◊P is read as "Possibly, P" and indicates that the statement P is possible (true in at least one possible world). ¬◊P is read as "Not-possibly, P," meaning it is impossible for P to be true.
Example: ◊P is read as "Possibly, P".

"Would" Counterfactual (□→)
Meaning: This symbol is used in counterfactual logic for conditional statements in the subjunctive mood that state what would happen if the antecedent were true. P □→ Q is read as "If it were the case that P, then it would be the case that Q".
Example: The conditional "If Oswald hadn’t shot Kennedy, then somebody else would have" is a "would" counterfactual. It would be symbolized using □→.

"Might" Counterfactual (◊→)
Meaning: This symbol is used in counterfactual logic for conditional statements in the subjunctive mood that state what might happen if the antecedent were true. P ◊→ Q is read as "If it were the case that P, then it might be the case that Q". It is defined as the contradictory of P □→ ¬Q. "Might" indicates a genuine, live option under the circumstances.

(●) Acquaintance Knowledge (Knowing-by-acquaintance): Knowing something because the object of knowledge is directly present to one’s consciousness. For example, Dan knows the ball in front of him because he sees it and is directly aware of it...he knows it by sensory intuition. In this context, intuition does not mean a guess or irrational hunch, but rather a direct awareness of something present to consciousness. People know many things by acquaintance or intuition, such as their own mental states (thoughts, feelings, sensations), physical objects they perceive through the five senses, and, according to some, even basic principles of mathematics. When asked how people know that 2 + 2 = 4 or that if it is raining outside then it must be wet outside, the answer seems to be that people can simply “see” these truths. This kind of “seeing” is often thought to involve an intuitional form of awareness or perception of abstract, immaterial objects and the relationships among them...such as numbers, mathematical relations, propositions, and the laws of logic. Thus, all these examples are arguably cases of knowledge by acquaintance.

(●) Procedural Knowledge (Knowing-how): The ability or skill to behave in a certain way and perform some task or set of behaviors. One can know how to speak Greek, play golf, ride a bicycle, or perform a number of other skills. Know-how does not always involve conscious awareness of what one is doing. Someone can learn how to do something by repeated practice without being consciously aware that one is doing the activity in question or without having any idea of the theory behind the practice. For example, one can know how to adjust one’s swing for a curve ball without consciously being aware that one’s stride is changing or without knowing any background theory of hitting technique.

(●) Propositional Knowledge (Knowing-by-description): This is knowledge of facts or truths, expressed in declarative sentences. For example, "I know that water boils at 100 degrees Celsius." It is the most discussed type in philosophy and is often analyzed as "justified true belief."

(●) The Quest to Define Knowledge
Since the time of Plato, philosophers have debated the nature of propositional knowledge...what it means to truly "know" something. In his dialogue Theaetetus, Plato explored the idea that knowledge might be "true belief with an account," a view that later evolved into the well-known "justified true belief" (JTB) analysis. "true judgment with an account"...is the closest to what later philosophers called "justified true belief." However, Plato ultimately finds problems with each definition and does not endorse any as a final answer in the dialogue.

(●) The Standard Definition: Justified True Belief (JTB)
The standard definition states that knowledge consists of three essential components: justification, truth, and belief. To say someone knows a proposition (for example, "milk is in the refrigerator") means that three conditions must be met: the proposition must be true, the person must believe it, and the belief must be justified.

(●) Truth as a Necessary Condition
For someone to know something, it must be true. It would be nonsensical to claim that someone knows a falsehood. However, truth alone is not enough for knowledge. There are countless truths that no one knows or has even considered.

(●) Belief as a Necessary Condition
In addition to truth, belief is required. If a person does not believe a proposition, it cannot be said that they know it. However, simply believing something does not make it knowledge, since people can believe many things that are not true.

(●) The Insufficiency of True Belief
Even when a belief is true, that alone does not guarantee knowledge. A person might believe something that happens to be true purely by chance, without any justification. For example, if someone randomly thinks, "It is raining in Moscow right now," and it happens to be true, this is not knowledge...just a lucky guess.

(●) The Role of Justification
What distinguishes knowledge from mere true belief is justification or warrant. Justification means having sufficient evidence, forming beliefs in a reliable way (such as through the senses or expert testimony), and having properly functioning intellectual faculties in a suitable environment. The difference between a true belief and knowledge is that knowledge requires this additional element of justification or warrant.

(●) The Tripartite Analysis
The traditional or standard definition of propositional knowledge can be summarized as follows:
A person S knows that P if and only if:
1. S believes that P.
2. P is true.
3. S is justified in believing that P at the time S believes it.
This tripartite analysis remains a foundational concept in the philosophical study of knowledge.

(●) From Justification to Warrant
Twentieth century epistemology was dominated by the “justified true belief” (JTB) model of knowledge. But after Gettier style counterexamples showed that justified true belief can still fall short of knowledge, many philosophers argued that something crucial was missing from the analysis. Alvin Plantinga’s notion of warrant is one influential attempt to supply that missing ingredient and to explain what, in addition to truth and belief, turns a mere true belief into knowledge. Plantinga reserves the term “justification” for deontological or duty related notions (being blameless or responsible in believing), and uses “warrant” for the quality that actually makes a true belief into knowledge. On his view, a person can be justified yet still lack warrant if their faculties are not functioning in the right way or the environment is misleading.

(●) What Is Warrant?
Plantinga uses “warrant” for that special positive quality which, when added to truth and belief in sufficient degree, yields knowledge. True belief without warrant might be lucky, accidental, or unsupported. True belief with enough warrant is not just accidentally right; it is produced in the right way, by the right kinds of cognitive processes, in the right sort of situation.

(●) Proper Function and the Design Plan
On Plantinga’s account, a belief has warrant when it is produced by cognitive faculties (such as memory, perception, and reason) that are functioning properly, that is, according to a design plan, under conditions for which those faculties were designed. Proper function rules out malfunction (as in hallucination, severe cognitive damage, or pathological bias) and anchors knowledge in the normal operation of our intellectual equipment.

(●) The Right Environment
Proper function alone is not enough. Our faculties must also be operating in an environment similar to the one for which they were designed. Human vision, for example, is made for a world with normal lighting, ordinary distances, and reliable objects, not for distorted fun house mirrors or systematically deceptive laboratory setups. When the environment is too different from the one anticipated by the design plan, even properly functioning faculties may no longer reliably yield true beliefs.

(●) Aim at Truth and Sufficient Success
The design plan of our cognitive faculties is also aimed at truth. Under the right conditions, these faculties are successfully truth orientated. Warrant comes in degrees, depending on how well the faculties are functioning, how appropriate the environment is, and how truth conducive the processes are in that setting. When a belief is formed by properly functioning, truth aimed faculties in an appropriate environment and enjoys enough of this positive status, that belief is warranted.

(●) Maxi Environment and Mini Environment
Plantinga distinguishes between a broad “maxi environment” (the general kind of world in which our faculties are meant to operate) and the more specific “mini environments” in which particular beliefs are formed (for example, this specific room, this particular test, that specific instrument). A belief can be formed in the right kind of world overall yet still arise in a misleading local setup, a mini environment in which the usual methods are no longer reliably truth producing.

(●) Resolving Gettier Style Luck
Gettier examples show that justified true belief can occur in situations where the truth of the belief depends heavily on coincidence. Plantinga diagnoses these as cases where proper function and the broad environment may be fine, but the specific mini environment is epistemically hostile or deceptive. In such cases, the belief does not achieve the degree of warrant required for knowledge, even if it happens to be true and justified by the subject’s lights.

(●) Warrant and Knowledge
On Plantinga’s proposal, we can summarize knowledge as follows:
A person S knows that P if and only if:
1. S believes that P.
2. P is true.
3. S’s belief that P has enough warrant (is formed by properly functioning, truth aimed faculties, operating according to a good design plan, in an appropriate environment).
Warrant thus replaces bare “justification” as the crucial fourth factor that explains why some true beliefs are merely lucky while others rise to the level of genuine knowledge.

(●) Socrates was an Athenian philosopher who is widely regarded as one of the founders of Western philosophy. He wrote no philosophical texts himself; instead, his ideas and methods are known through the works of his students, especially Plato and Xenophon, as well as the playwright Aristophanes. Socrates is famous for his method of questioning (the Socratic method or elenchus), which sought to expose contradictions in his interlocutors’ beliefs and to stimulate critical thinking and self-examination. He focused on ethical questions and the pursuit of virtue, famously claiming that he knew nothing except his own ignorance. Socrates was tried and executed by the city of Athens on charges of impiety and corrupting the youth, choosing to die rather than renounce his philosophical mission.

(Q) "The unexamined life is not worth living." Source: Plato, Apology 38a

(Q) "I know that I know nothing." Source: Plato, Apology 21d (paraphrased; the exact phrase is "I am wiser than this man; it is likely that neither of us knows anything worthwhile, but he thinks he knows something when he does not, whereas when I do not know, neither do I think I know.")

(●) Plato was an Athenian philosopher, a student of Socrates and teacher of Aristotle, whose dialogues shaped the entire subsequent tradition of Western philosophy. Through dramatic conversations, he argued that beyond the changing world of sense experience there exists an intelligible, eternal order of Forms (or Ideas), culminating in the Form of the Good, which grounds truth, beauty, and moral value. He defended the immortality and accountability of the soul, the objectivity of moral norms, and the idea that a well‑ordered society must be governed by wisdom rather than mere power. Plato’s vision of a transcendent Good, his distinction between the visible and invisible realms, and his insistence that the soul is ordered to truth and righteousness provided powerful conceptual scaffolding later used by Christian thinkers (especially Augustine) to articulate doctrines of God as the supreme Good, the created/uncreated distinction, the immortality of the soul, and the moral structure of reality.

(Q) "This, then, which gives to the objects of knowledge their truth, and to the knower his power of knowing, you must say is the idea of the Good." Source: Plato, Republic VI, 508e–509a.

(Q) "When the soul inquires alone and by itself, it departs to that which is pure, ever existing, immortal and unchanging, and being akin to it, it always stays with it whenever it is by itself and can do so; then it ceases from its wandering and remains always the same with that which is the same." Source: Plato, Phaedo 79d–e.

(Q) "Evil cannot be done away with, for there must always remain something opposite to good; but it never has a place among the gods, only among mortal nature and this world of ours." Source: Plato, Timaeus 29e–30a (on the goodness of the divine craftsman and the disorder of the material world).

(Q) "The just man does not allow the diverse elements in his soul to meddle with one another, but he sets his own house in order and rules himself; he becomes his own friend and harmonizes the three parts of himself like three terms in a musical scale, the lowest and the highest and the middle, and all together he binds them into a unity." Source: Plato, Republic IV, 443d–e.

(●) Aristotle, a student of Plato from the city of Stagira, became one of the most comprehensive and systematic thinkers in history. He developed formal logic, a detailed account of causality and change, and an ethics centered on virtue and human flourishing (eudaimonia). In metaphysics he distinguished between act and potency, substance and accidents, and argued for the existence of an unmoved mover: a necessary, eternal, immaterial source of all motion and order in the universe. In ethics and politics, he taught that human beings have a natural end and that moral and civic life should be ordered toward the cultivation of virtue. Aristotelian ideas about being, causality, teleology, and the highest good became foundational for classical Christian theism and natural law theory; theologians such as Thomas Aquinas drew extensively on Aristotle’s concepts of first cause, final causality, and virtue to articulate philosophical arguments for God’s existence, providence, and the objective moral law.

(Q) "There is something which moves without being moved, being eternal, substance and actuality; and this is what we call God." Source: Aristotle, Metaphysics XII.7 (1072a24–26).

(Q) "The good for man is an activity of the soul in accordance with virtue, and if there are more kinds of virtue than one, in accordance with the best and most complete." Source: Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I.7 (1098a16–18).

(Q) "Nature does nothing in vain." Source: Aristotle, Politics I.2 (1253a8–9) and throughout his works, expressing his teleological view that natural beings act for ends.

(Q) "One must begin by observing that the law is a rule of reason, and the function of the law is to prescribe the right education that makes us good." Source: Paraphrase of Aristotle’s teaching in Nicomachean Ethics II.1–2 and X.9, where he describes law as a rational guide ordered to virtue and the common good.

(●) Epicurus was a Greek philosopher who founded one of the most influential schools of Hellenistic philosophy, Epicureanism. He taught that the highest good is pleasure, understood not as indulgence but as the absence of pain (aponia) and mental disturbance (ataraxia). To achieve this tranquility, Epicurus advocated a materialist metaphysics: the universe consists only of atoms and void, the soul is material and mortal, and the gods (if they exist) are distant and uninvolved in human affairs. He denied divine providence, final causality, and life after death, arguing that fear of the gods and death are the chief sources of human anxiety and should be dispelled through reason. Epicureanism represents a direct challenge to core Christian doctrines: it denies creation by a personal God, divine providence and judgment, the immortality of the soul, and the resurrection of the body. The Apostle Paul encountered Epicurean philosophers in Athens (Acts 17:18), and early Christian apologists consistently refuted Epicurean materialism, arguing instead for a rational Creator, moral accountability, and the hope of eternal life.

(Q) "Death is nothing to us. When we exist, death is not yet present, and when death is present, then we do not exist." Source: Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus 125.

(Q) "Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is not omnipotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Then whence cometh evil? Is he neither able nor willing? Then why call him God?" Source: Attributed to Epicurus in later tradition (especially by Lactantius, On the Anger of God 13.20–21); the formulation is not found verbatim in Epicurus' surviving writings but reflects his argument that divine providence is incompatible with the existence of evil.

(Q) "The blessed and indestructible being of the divine has no troubles itself, nor does it cause trouble for anyone else, so that it is not affected by feelings of anger or gratitude. All such things are found only in what is weak." Source: Epicurus, Principal Doctrines 1 (from Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers X.139).

(Q) "We must free ourselves from the prison of everyday affairs and politics." Source: Epicurus, Vatican Sayings 58; reflects his teaching to "live hidden" (lathe biōsas) and withdraw from public life to cultivate tranquility.

(●) Philo of Alexandria was a Hellenistic Jewish philosopher who lived in the city of Alexandria, Egypt. Born into a wealthy diaspora family and educated in both Jewish Scripture and Greek paideia, he developed a distinctive synthesis of Jewish scriptural exegesis with Greek philosophical traditions, especially Platonism and Stoicism, chiefly through allegorical interpretation of the Pentateuch. Philo treated the narratives of the Torah as veils for universal truths about God, the soul, and virtue, insisting that Moses is the “summit of philosophy” and that Greek philosophers only glimpsed what the Law reveals more fully. Central to his thought is the doctrine of the divine Logos: the Logos is God’s Word, Wisdom, and mediating power, the intelligible pattern of creation and the bridge between the utterly transcendent God and the created order. His use of Logos language, his account of an utterly transcendent yet provident God, and his attempt to show the rationality of biblical faith later provided early Christian theologians with categories for articulating the doctrine of the Logos.

(Q) "For God, being one, has many powers; and the chief of them all is the Logos, by whom the whole world was fashioned." Source: Philo, On the Confusion of Tongues 146–147 (summarizing his description of the Logos as God’s chief power and instrument of creation).

(Q) "Let us learn that there is one world, one God, one providence, and one law, the common reason of all intellectual and rational beings." Source: Philo, On the Creation of the World 3–4 and related passages, where he stresses the unity of God, world, and rational law (logos) imprinted on creation.

(Q) "The Logos is the image of God, by whom the whole universe was formed." Source: Philo, On the Creation of the World 25–27 (paraphrasing his teaching that the visible cosmos is made after the intelligible pattern in the divine Logos, the image of God).

(Q) "The soul that loves God desires to flee from the body and the senses, and to dwell with Him alone who is incorporeal and invisible, apprehended only by the pure mind." Source: Philo, On the Migration of Abraham 10–12 and related allegorical passages on the soul’s journey from sense to contemplation of God through the Logos.

(●) According to the disciples and eye-witness biblical authors of the New Testament gospels, Jesus of Nazareth is the eternal Son of God who entered history as the long‑promised Messiah of Israel. Born in Bethlehem to the virgin Mary during the reign of Herod the Great, He grew up in Nazareth, worked as a carpenter, and began His public ministry around age thirty after being baptized by John the Baptist and affirmed by the Father and the Holy Spirit. Proclaiming the kingdom of God, Jesus taught with unique authority, performed miracles, healings, exorcisms, and gathered disciples, especially the twelve apostles, while calling people to repentance and faith in Him. He fulfilled Old Testament prophecy in His life, death, and resurrection, and confronted both legalistic religion and spiritual hypocrisy of the Jewish religious leaders. Under the Roman governor Pontius Pilate, Jesus was crucified outside Jerusalem as a substitutionary sacrifice for human sin, foretold in Scripture and grounded in real space‑time history as true historical event. On the third day, He physically rose bodily from the dead, appeared to many witnesses, and commissioned His followers to proclaim the gospel to all nations, then ascended into heaven, where He reigns as Lord and will visibly return to judge the living and the dead and fully establish His kingdom.

(Q) "I am the way, and the truth, and the life. No one comes to the Father except through me." Source: John 14:6.

(Q) "Repent, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand." Source: Matthew 4:17 (cf. Mark 1:15).

(Q) "For God so loved the world, that he gave his only Son, that whoever believes in him should not perish but have eternal life." Source: John 3:16.

(Q) "Come to me, all who labor and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest." Source: Matthew 11:28.

(Q) "I am the resurrection and the life. Whoever believes in me, though he die, yet shall he live." Source: John 11:25.

(Q) "For the Son of Man came not to be served but to serve, and to give his life as a ransom for many." Source: Mark 10:45 (cf. Matthew 20:28).

(Q) "You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your mind. This is the great and first commandment. And a second is like it: You shall love your neighbor as yourself." Source: Matthew 22:37–39 (cf. Mark 12:29–31).

(Q) "Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. [...] Blessed are those who hunger and thirst for righteousness, for they shall be satisfied." Source: Matthew 5:3, 6.

(Q) "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do." Source: Luke 23:34.

(Q) "All authority in heaven and on earth has been given to me. Go therefore and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, teaching them to observe all that I have commanded you. And behold, I am with you always, to the end of the age." Source: Matthew 28:18–20.

(●) Saul of Tarsus, later known as the apostle Paul, was a first‑century Jew from the city of Tarsus in Cilicia, a Roman citizen and a Pharisee trained under the respected rabbi Gamaliel. Zealous for the traditions of his ancestors, he initially viewed the early Christian movement as a dangerous heresy and actively persecuted followers of Jesus, approving of the stoning of Stephen and seeking to imprison believers. While traveling to Damascus to arrest Christians, he experienced a dramatic encounter with the risen Jesus, who appeared to him in blinding light, confronted his persecution, and commissioned him as a chosen instrument to carry the gospel to Gentiles, kings, and the people of Israel. After his conversion and baptism, Paul began preaching that Jesus is the Messiah and Son of God, eventually undertaking multiple missionary journeys throughout the Roman Empire, planting churches, training leaders, and enduring intense opposition, suffering, and imprisonment. He articulated key doctrines of the faith such as justification by grace through faith, union with Christ, and the inclusion of Gentiles in God’s people in letters to various churches and individuals. Many of these letters, including Romans, Corinthians, Galatians, and others, are preserved in the New Testament and have profoundly shaped Christian theology and practice. According to early tradition, Paul was eventually martyred in Rome during the reign of Nero, having fought the good fight, finished his course, and kept the faith.

(Q) "For I am not ashamed of the gospel, for it is the power of God for salvation to everyone who believes, to the Jew first and also to the Greek." Source: Romans 1:16.

(Q) "For all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God, and are justified by his grace as a gift, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus." Source: Romans 3:23–24.

(Q) "But God shows his love for us in that while we were still sinners, Christ died for us." Source: Romans 5:8.

(Q) "There is therefore now no condemnation for those who are in Christ Jesus." Source: Romans 8:1.

(Q) "For I am sure that neither death nor life, nor angels nor rulers, nor things present nor things to come, nor powers, nor height nor depth, nor anything else in all creation, will be able to separate us from the love of God in Christ Jesus our Lord." Source: Romans 8:38–39.

(Q) "I have been crucified with Christ. It is no longer I who live, but Christ who lives in me. And the life I now live in the flesh I live by faith in the Son of God, who loved me and gave himself for me." Source: Galatians 2:20.

(Q) "For by grace you have been saved through faith. And this is not your own doing; it is the gift of God, not a result of works, so that no one may boast." Source: Ephesians 2:8–9.

(Q) "For to me to live is Christ, and to die is gain." Source: Philippians 1:21.

(Q) "Therefore, if anyone is in Christ, he is a new creation. The old has passed away; behold, the new has come. All this is from God, who through Christ reconciled us to himself and gave us the ministry of reconciliation; that is, in Christ God was reconciling the world to himself, not counting their trespasses against them, and entrusting to us the message of reconciliation. Therefore, we are ambassadors for Christ, God making his appeal through us. We implore you on behalf of Christ, be reconciled to God. For our sake he made him to be sin who knew no sin, so that in him we might become the righteousness of God." Source: 2 Corinthians 5:17–21.

(Q) "I have fought the good fight, I have finished the race, I have kept the faith." Source: 2 Timothy 4:7.