Intro
Bart Ehrman, an American New Testament scholar writing from a skeptical perspective, proposes the following sequence:
(1) The disciples remained convinced Jesus was the Messiah despite His crucifixion.
(2) They re-read Israel’s Scriptures and concluded God had vindicated Jesus by exalting Him to heaven.
(3) They later came to express this vindication in terms of “resurrection” and imminent return.
(4) By the time resurrection was publicly proclaimed the body had decomposed so the claim could not be checked.
(5) The appearance tradition arose through a combination of sincere visionary experiences and later story development.
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The following argument is a refutation of Ehrman’s hypothesis:
The main question is whether these steps actually get us to what early Christians proclaimed, namely, that Jesus was bodily raised from the dead within history, and that this was publicly knowable and central to their message.
(P1)
In Second Temple Judaism, “vindicated in heaven” is not the same idea as “bodily raised from the dead,” so the shift from exaltation to resurrection is not an obvious or natural step without further explanation.
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Many Jews expected resurrection as a bodily event at the end of the age. By contrast, a person can be honored or exalted with God without implying their corpse has been transformed and raised. So if the first belief is simply “God vindicated Jesus in heaven,” the hypothesis still must explain why the message became “God raised Jesus from the dead” in a strong, bodily sense.
(P2)
Visions, even if sincere, do not automatically lead to a bodily-resurrection conclusion, because visions can be interpreted as heavenly comfort or vindication without implying that death has been reversed in the body.
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A reported experience of seeing a deceased person can support several interpretations, such as “God is honoring him” or “he is with God.” It does not, on its own, force the conclusion “his body has been raised.” Therefore a vision-based account must explain why early Christians settled on the specific conclusion of bodily resurrection, rather than a more general claim of heavenly vindication.
(P3)
The appeal to decomposition as a reason the claim could not be checked is a weak support, because decomposition does not remove remains, and disputes about burial can still be raised and tested.
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Even if soft tissue decays, remains may still exist, and people can still argue about where someone was buried, whether the burial story is accurate, and whether opponents could challenge it. If “no one could check” is doing important work in the hypothesis, then the timeline and social conditions that made checking impossible must be argued for, not simply assumed.
(P4)
The early resurrection message is presented as public, stable, and tied to named witnesses, which is difficult to explain if the account depends on a slow drift from exaltation language to resurrection language plus a patchwork of invention.
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A good historical explanation should account for why the claim did not remain vague, private, or purely spiritual. Instead, the message that took hold was strong and concrete: Jesus was raised, and He appeared to specific people and groups. If the hypothesis answers hard cases by saying “some reports were made up” and protects itself by saying “no one could check,” it begins to look less like a single explanatory story and more like a set of add-ons designed to keep the hypothesis afloat.
(P5)
Because the hypothesis relies on several extra assumptions to get to the final result, it lacks the explanatory simplicity and unity we should prefer when comparing competing accounts.
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The decisive steps are carried by additional moves that are not clearly demanded by the earlier steps: exaltation is made to become bodily resurrection, an unverifiability timeline is invoked, and selective invention is introduced to fill remaining gaps. The more a theory must rely on separate, independent assumptions, the less confident we should be that it is tracking what actually happened.
(C)
Therefore, Ehrman’s hypothesis is not a satisfactory explanation of the origin of early Christian resurrection belief, because it does not give a clear and plausible bridge from exaltation to bodily resurrection and it depends on extra assumptions that weaken its overall coherence.
N. T. Wright, The Resurrection of the Son of God.
Gary Habermas and Mike Licona, The Case for the Resurrection of Jesus.
Richard Bauckham, Jesus and the Eyewitnesses.
InspiringPhilosophy. n.d. “4. The Resurrection of Jesus (Advanced Theories).” YouTube.
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If Jesus was believed to be vindicated in heaven, calling that “resurrection” is simply a natural way of speaking.
1. The concepts are different, and people in that world knew the difference.
“Vindicated with God” (exaltation, assumption, being received into heaven) answers the question, “Where is he now?” “Resurrection” answers a different question: “What happened to his death and his body?” In Jewish thought, resurrection is about death being undone in embodied life, not merely about honor after death.
2. A “natural way of speaking” would likely have been less specific than bodily resurrection.
If the original conviction were simply “God has honored Jesus,” then language like “exalted,” “taken up,” “vindicated,” or “with the Lord” would fit the conceptual toolkit without forcing the stronger claim that death itself has been reversed. The fact that “raised from the dead” becomes central demands explanation, not just a note that religious language is flexible.
3. The hypothesis needs a bridge, not just a label.
It is not enough to say, “They started using resurrection language.” One must explain why this community chose the strongest available category (resurrection) rather than a more common post-mortem vindication category. Wright’s work is especially relevant here because it maps the Jewish meanings of “resurrection” and shows how distinctive the early Christian claim is.
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Post-bereavement visions are common, so visions adequately explain the resurrection belief.
1. Even sincere visions do not settle what kind of claim is being made.
Someone can sincerely report an experience and still interpret it in different ways. In ancient religious contexts, an experience of a deceased person could be taken as a dream, a heavenly message, an angelic appearance, or a sign of post-mortem blessedness. None of these automatically implies bodily resurrection.
2. The content of the early proclamation is stronger than “we had experiences.”
The early Christian claim is not merely that Jesus was spiritually present or remembered powerfully, but that God raised Him from the dead. That is a claim about what God did to Jesus’ death, not merely about what the disciples felt or perceived. A vision-based account must explain why the community’s settled conclusion was bodily raising rather than “Jesus is with God” or “Jesus spoke to us from heaven.”
3. The interpretive direction is historically non-trivial.
Within Second Temple Judaism, if someone had a vision of a deceased righteous person, that would normally confirm the person is dead and in God’s care. It would not normally generate the announcement, “He has already been resurrected ahead of everyone else.” So, visions can be part of an explanation, but they cannot be the whole explanation unless the hypothesis provides a credible reason the visions were interpreted as bodily resurrection.
4. The hypothesis must also account for why the claim became public and communal.
Private experiences are common; what is unusual is the rapid emergence of a public, communal message anchored to named witnesses and repeated as a core confession. Bauckham’s emphasis on named testimony is relevant here: the traditions are presented as connected to identifiable persons, not as anonymous spiritual impressions.
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Once decomposition occurred, there was no meaningful way to check the claim, so the resurrection message could develop freely.
1. Decomposition does not equal “nothing to check.”
Ancient Jews knew very well that bodies decay. That is precisely why burial practices often included the later handling of bones. The fact of decomposition would not make talk of burial, remains, or location meaningless. It may complicate matters, but it does not erase them.
2. The claim being preached is the kind of claim that invites contradiction.
“God raised Him from the dead” is not merely an inward spiritual thesis. It is a claim about something happening in the world, and critics can respond in worldly ways: disputing burial claims, offering alternative burial accounts, accusing theft, or challenging the credibility of witnesses. A hypothesis cannot simply assume that public challenge is impossible without showing why.
3. The chronology has to be earned.
If the theory needs a long delay such that verification becomes difficult, that delay must be supported by independent historical considerations. Otherwise the explanation risks circularity: it works only because it assumes the conditions it needs to work.
4. “Uncheckability” is not positive evidence.
At best it explains why a false claim might survive. It does not by itself explain why the claim took the specific form of bodily resurrection, nor why it was compelling enough to become the central proclamation of a movement. Historical reasoning should prefer explanations that do more than merely reduce the possibility of refutation.
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If some reports are inventions or embellishments, the remaining core can be explained by exaltation and visions.
1. “Some were invented” is too easy unless the historian provides controls.
Any complex tradition includes development. The real question is which elements are likely early and why. If “invention” is introduced whenever an item is difficult, it becomes a theory-saving device rather than a conclusion grounded in method.
2. A mixed model must explain why the tradition is anchored to named witnesses.
The resurrection tradition repeatedly attaches claims to specific people. This does not prove the claims are true, but it does raise the historical cost of wholesale invention, especially if the message is early and public. Bauckham’s work is relevant here because it highlights how naming functions in ancient testimony traditions.
3. Invention does not solve the central conceptual problem.
Even if some later details are embellishments, the core proclamation remains: Jesus is “raised.” The hypothesis still has to explain why the early community chose the bodily resurrection category, rather than staying with exaltation or general vindication.
4. Pruning the hard cases can make the theory unfalsifiable.
If every inconvenient datum can be removed as “legend,” then the hypothesis becomes immune to evidence. But an explanation that cannot, in principle, be put at risk by evidence is not a strong historical explanation. It can always be adjusted, but that is not the same as being well supported.
5. Explanations should be weighed by overall explanatory power, not by how easily they can be patched.
Habermas and Licona emphasize abductive comparison: which hypothesis explains the broadest range of relevant data with the fewest strained additions. A model that repeatedly adds special pleas (invention here, unverifiability there) risks losing that comparative advantage.