(P1)
If robust naturalism is true, then God or things like God do not exist.
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This premise defines what we mean by robust naturalism and its metaphysical commitments.
(1) What is robust naturalism?
Robust naturalism is the metaphysical view that:
- Reality is exhausted by the space-time universe.
- Everything that exists is physical: matter, energy, and the physical laws that govern them.
- There are no supernatural entities, no immaterial souls, no abstract minds, no God.
As philosopher J.P. Moreland explains, on this view:
- Humans are entirely physical beings (our brains and bodies).
- Mental states are identical to or wholly dependent on brain states.
- All causation is event-event causation (physical events causing other physical events).
- There is no "top-down" causation from immaterial minds or souls.
(2) What counts as "things like God"?
By "things like God," we mean:
- Immaterial minds or souls that can causally interact with the physical world.
- Rational agents who act as first causes or unmoved movers.
- Beings that possess libertarian freedom (explained in P2).
The argument doesn't require proving the full-orbed God of classical theism at this stage. It aims to show that some kind of non-physical, rational, free agency exists, which is incompatible with robust naturalism.
(3) Why does naturalism exclude these things?
Naturalism's commitment to physicalism entails:
- No substance dualism: There are no immaterial souls distinct from bodies.
- No agent causation: Only physical events cause other physical events; persons as substances don't act as first movers.
- No libertarian freedom: If determinism is true (as most naturalists hold), or if indeterminism yields only quantum randomness, there's no room for the control libertarian freedom requires.
As philosopher William Hasker notes, naturalism implies that "all natural causal relations have first members in the category of event or state of affairs," not persons or agents acting as unmoved movers.
(4) The incompatibility is mutual exclusion.
If robust naturalism is true:
- Then there is no God (who is an immaterial, rational agent).
- And there are no immaterial human souls with libertarian freedom.
If God or things like God exist:
- Then robust naturalism is false.
- Reality includes more than just physical stuff.
Therefore, premise (P1) simply articulates this logical relationship: naturalism and God (or God-like entities) cannot both be true.
(P2)
If God or things like God do not exist, then humanity does not freely think in the libertarian sense.
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This premise connects the non-existence of God with the impossibility of libertarian free thought.
(1) What is libertarian free will?
Libertarian freedom involves several key elements:
- Categorical ability: The power to do otherwise, given exactly the same past and laws of nature.
- Agent causation: Persons as substances act as first causes or unmoved movers.
- Dual control: The ability to exercise one's power to act or to refrain from acting.
Consider Aristotle's illustration from Physics 256a: "A staff moves a stone, and is moved by a hand, which is moved by a man." The staff and hand are instrumental causes that passively receive and transfer motion. But the man himself is the first mover, the originating source of the action. He doesn't passively receive motion from something prior; he simply acts.
Similarly, on libertarian freedom:
- I don't just passively experience thoughts happening in me.
- I myself, as an agent, originate my own thoughts and choices.
- I am in control because I am the first cause of my mental acts.
(2) Why does libertarian freedom require substance dualism or something like it?
For libertarian freedom to exist:
- Persons must be genuine substances (not just streams of events).
- They must possess active causal powers (not just passive liabilities).
- They must be able to act as first movers (unmoved movers) in their thinking.
On naturalism:
- Persons are physical organisms wholly composed of matter.
- Mental events are either identical to brain events or wholly depend on them.
- All causation is event-event causation governed by physical laws.
Philosopher John Bishop admits the problem:
"The problem of natural agency is an ontological problem about whether the existence of actions can be admitted within a natural scientific ontology. Naturalism does not essentially employ the concept of a causal relation whose first member is in the category of person or agent. All natural causal relations have first members in the category of event or state of affairs."
In other words, naturalism has no room for persons as agents who initiate their own actions. Only events cause events.
(3) Why can't naturalism accommodate libertarian free thought?
On naturalism, every thought you have is:
- The inevitable result of prior brain states.
- Which were caused by prior brain states.
- Which were caused by earlier physical events.
- Tracing back to states before you were born.
Think of it like dominos falling:
- Each domino (thought or brain state) falls because the previous one knocked it over.
- You as a person are just the series of falling dominos.
- You never step in as an agent to originate anything; you're just a theater where dominos fall.
Or consider another analogy:
- Imagine a computer running a program.
- Each computational state follows necessarily from the previous state and the program's code.
- No matter how complex the program, the computer never "freely chooses" its outputs.
- On naturalism, human thought is like that: determined by the "program" of physical laws and prior states.
(4) What about quantum indeterminacy?
Some suggest quantum mechanics introduces indeterminism that could ground freedom. But this doesn't help:
- Quantum events (if truly indeterministic) are random, not controlled by the agent.
- Introducing randomness into thought processes doesn't give the agent control; it just adds noise.
As Alvin Plantinga notes, libertarian freedom requires:
- Not just indeterminism (absence of determinism).
- But agent causation: the person as substance acting as a first cause.
Quantum randomness provides neither substance nor agency.
(5) The connection to God or things like God.
Libertarian freedom requires:
- An immaterial aspect of persons (such as a soul or mind) that can act as a genuine first cause of actions, independent of physical causation.
- Or, at minimum, a non-physical dimension of reality that enables agent causation in a way that is not reducible to or determined by prior physical events.
But naturalism denies both. Therefore:
- If naturalism is true (no God, no immaterial realities), then libertarian freedom is impossible.
- Conversely, if libertarian freedom exists, naturalism must be false.
The premise states this connection: without God or God-like entities (immaterial, rational agents with causal power), humanity cannot possess libertarian free thought.
(P3)
If humanity does not freely think in the libertarian sense, then humanity is never epistemically responsible.
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This premise argues that genuine epistemic responsibility presupposes libertarian freedom.
(1) What is epistemic responsibility?
Epistemic responsibility means:
- Being accountable for what you believe and how you form beliefs.
- Being praiseworthy when you carefully weigh evidence and avoid bias.
- Being blameworthy when you ignore evidence, refuse to consider alternatives, or believe rashly.
We exercise epistemic responsibility when we:
- Investigate claims before accepting them.
- Examine our own biases and preconceptions.
- Proportion our confidence to the strength of evidence.
- Follow arguments where they lead, even if the conclusion is uncomfortable.
(2) Why does epistemic responsibility require libertarian freedom?
Consider what must be true for genuine responsibility:
First, you must have control over your beliefs:
- If every belief you hold is the inevitable result of physical causes beyond your control, how are you responsible for it?
- It's like holding someone responsible for their height or eye color determined by genetics and development.
Think of an analogy:
- Suppose a mad scientist implants an electrode in your brain.
- Every time you're about to disbelieve naturalism, he triggers the electrode causing you to believe it.
- Clearly you're not epistemically responsible for believing naturalism in that case.
But on naturalism, all your beliefs are similarly caused by factors beyond your control:
- Not a mad scientist, but genes, environment, and brain chemistry.
- The only difference is the causal chain extends further back.
- Either way, you lack genuine control.
Second, you must be able to respond to reasons:
- Epistemic responsibility involves assessing arguments and evidence.
- You must be able to change your mind based on what you judge to be better reasons.
- But if your beliefs are fixed by physical causes, you never genuinely "respond to reasons."
Consider a specific example:
- You encounter evidence against a belief you hold.
- To be epistemically responsible, you must be able to:
• Consider the evidence fairly.
• Weigh it against evidence for your current belief.
• Change your mind if the evidence warrants it.
But on naturalism where determinism reigns:
- Whether you consider the evidence fairly is determined by brain states.
- Whether you change your mind is determined by prior causes.
- You never have the power to do otherwise.
So epistemic responsibility requires libertarian control over belief formation.
(3) The distinction between "ought" and "is."
Epistemic responsibility involves normative concepts:
- "You ought to have examined the evidence more carefully."
- "You should have considered alternative explanations."
- "You were right to withhold judgment given insufficient data."
But normative "oughts" presuppose "can":
- If you literally could not have examined evidence more carefully (your brain states made it impossible), then it makes no sense to say you "ought" to have done so.
- As philosophers say: "ought" implies "can."
On libertarian freedom:
- You could have examined evidence more carefully (genuine ability).
- Therefore it makes sense to say you ought to have done so.
On naturalism (assuming determinism):
- You could not have done otherwise given prior physical states.
- Therefore talk of "ought" collapses into mere expression of preference or social disapproval.
(4) Why compatibilist freedom doesn't solve the problem.
Compatibilists argue:
- You're free if you act according to your strongest desires.
- Even if those desires are determined, you're still "free" and can be responsible.
But for epistemic responsibility, this won't work:
Imagine someone who:
- Desires to believe naturalism because of social pressure, fear of theism's implications, or stubbornness.
- This desire was itself caused by upbringing, genes, and environment.
- They "freely" (in the compatibilist sense) form beliefs according to this desire.
Are they epistemically responsible? It doesn't seem so:
- They never had the ability to desire differently or to override their strongest desire based on evidence.
- Their belief formation was entirely a product of non-rational causes (social pressure, fear, genetics).
- There's no point at which they, as rational agents, took control and chose to follow evidence over desire.
Genuine epistemic responsibility requires libertarian-style control where the agent can override determined desires and follow where reason leads.
(5) Implications for naturalism itself.
If naturalism is true and there's no libertarian freedom:
- Then naturalists aren't epistemically responsible for believing naturalism.
- Their belief is just the inevitable result of brain states caused by prior factors.
- There's no guarantee their belief-forming mechanisms track truth rather than survival.
This connects to Alvin Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (EAAN):
- Evolution selects for survival, not truth.
- Our beliefs (including belief in naturalism) would be selected for fitness, not accuracy.
- This gives us reason to doubt our cognitive faculties, including our belief in naturalism itself.
Therefore, epistemic responsibility presupposes libertarian freedom, and without it, we lose the grounds for holding anyone (including ourselves) responsible for their beliefs.
(P4)
Humanity is occasionally epistemically responsible.
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This premise affirms a nearly undeniable fact of our moral and intellectual experience.
(1) We constantly make judgments of epistemic responsibility.
In everyday life, we routinely:
- Praise people for intellectual virtues: careful reasoning, open-mindedness, intellectual honesty.
- Blame people for epistemic vices: wishful thinking, confirmation bias, willful ignorance.
Consider concrete examples:
A scientist who:
- Carefully reviews all data before publishing.
- Acknowledges limitations in methodology.
- Considers alternative explanations fairly.
We praise this as epistemically responsible.
A politician who:
- Ignores contradictory evidence.
- Refuses to consider other perspectives.
- Repeats claims known to be false.
We blame this as epistemically irresponsible.
A juror who:
- Examines evidence impartially.
- Avoids deciding before hearing all testimony.
- Resists emotional reasoning in favor of evidence.
We consider this person epistemically responsible.
(2) Our entire practice of rational discourse presupposes epistemic responsibility.
When we:
- Give arguments to convince others.
- Ask for evidence and reasons.
- Criticize fallacies and poor reasoning.
- Demand intellectual honesty and consistency.
We presuppose that people can be responsible for their beliefs:
- That they could examine evidence more carefully.
- That they should follow logical reasoning.
- That they're capable of changing their minds based on reasons.
Without epistemic responsibility:
- Rational argument becomes pointless (no one can choose to follow better reasons).
- Intellectual virtue and vice are meaningless categories.
- We're all just biological machines grinding out beliefs based on programming.
(3) Even philosophical skepticism presupposes epistemic responsibility.
Consider what happens when someone argues against epistemic responsibility:
- They present arguments.
- They expect you to evaluate those arguments.
- They think you should believe their conclusion if the arguments are sound.
But this only makes sense if:
- You have epistemic responsibility to assess arguments fairly.
- You can choose to follow where logic leads.
- You're capable of recognizing good reasons and believing accordingly.
In other words, denying epistemic responsibility is performatively self-defeating:
- The very act of arguing against it presupposes it.
- Like someone saying "I cannot speak English" in fluent English.
(4) Epistemic responsibility is more certain than any argument against it.
Similar to objective moral values (from the moral argument):
- Our direct awareness of epistemic responsibility is more certain than any philosophical premise.
- Any argument concluding "there is no epistemic responsibility" must have a premise less obvious than epistemic responsibility itself.
Consider naturalistic arguments against freedom:
- "All events are caused by prior physical events" (less certain than our awareness of freedom).
- "The brain determines all thoughts" (less certain than our experience of deliberation and choice).
- "Evolution selects for fitness, not truth" (less certain than our practice of rational inquiry).
In each case, the premise is more doubtful than the conclusion it tries to undermine.
(5) We have direct, first-person awareness of epistemic responsibility.
When you:
- Deliberate about what to believe.
- Weigh competing evidence.
- Make an effort to overcome bias.
- Choose to investigate further before deciding.
You experience yourself as an agent who is:
- In control of your thought processes.
- Able to direct attention and focus.
- Capable of accepting or rejecting considerations.
- Responsible for the conclusion you reach.
This first-person phenomenology of agency is difficult to dismiss:
- It's not just a theoretical postulate.
- It's our lived experience of thinking and reasoning.
(6) Objections must use the very capacity they deny.
Anyone who denies epistemic responsibility:
- Must form that belief somehow.
- Must think they have good reasons for it.
- Must present arguments they think others should accept.
But if there's no epistemic responsibility:
- Why should you have formed that belief rather than its opposite?
- What makes your "reasons" anything more than inevitable brain states?
- Why should anyone "accept" your arguments (implying they could do otherwise)?
The denial is self-referentially incoherent.
(7) The alternative is radical skepticism.
If we deny epistemic responsibility:
- We can't hold ourselves or others accountable for any beliefs.
- We can't meaningfully pursue truth or knowledge.
- We can't criticize poor reasoning or intellectual dishonesty.
- Science, philosophy, and rational inquiry lose their normative foundation.
This is too high a price. It's more reasonable to affirm:
- Humanity is occasionally epistemically responsible.
- We have genuine control over at least some belief formation.
- We can be praised or blamed for how we think and reason.
Therefore, premise (P4) stands: We are sometimes epistemically responsible, a fact more certain than any philosophical argument against it.
(C1)
Therefore, humanity freely thinks in the libertarian sense.
(From P3 and P4 by modus tollens)
The logic:
- P3: If no libertarian free thought → no epistemic responsibility.
- P4: We have epistemic responsibility.
- Therefore: We have libertarian free thought.
This conclusion establishes that humans possess genuine libertarian freedom in their thinking.
(C2)
Therefore, God or things like God exist.
(From P2 and C1 by modus tollens)
The logic:
- P2: If no God or things like God → no libertarian free thought.
- C1: We have libertarian free thought.
- Therefore: God or things like God exist.
This conclusion establishes that reality includes more than the physical: immaterial rational agents with libertarian freedom.
(C3)
Therefore, robust naturalism is false.
(From P1 and C2 by modus tollens)
The logic:
- P1: If robust naturalism → no God or things like God.
- C2: God or things like God exist.
- Therefore: Robust naturalism is false.
This conclusion undermines the metaphysical foundation of atheism.
(P5)
The biblical account of reality is one possible explanation for the existence of God, things like God, and the libertarian freedom of humanity.
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The biblical worldview offers specific resources for explaining what we've established:
(1) God as the ultimate rational agent.
- The God of Scripture is a personal, rational being who acts with libertarian freedom.
- He creates according to purposes and plans, not blind necessity.
- He is the paradigm of agent causation: the ultimate unmoved mover.
(2) Humans created in God's image.
- Genesis 1:26-27: "Let us make mankind in our image, in our likeness."
- This image includes rational and moral capacities.
- It explains why humans, like God, possess libertarian freedom and can act as rational agents.
(3) Immaterial souls interacting with bodies.
- The biblical anthropology includes both material and immaterial aspects of personhood.
- Humans are embodied souls, not merely material organisms.
- This provides the metaphysical foundation for libertarian freedom and agent causation.
(4) Designed cognitive faculties aimed at truth.
- God designed human rational faculties to track truth, not just survival.
- This grounds confidence in our reasoning abilities.
- As Proverbs 2:6 states: "For the LORD gives wisdom; from his mouth come knowledge and understanding."
Therefore, Christianity is a live candidate for explaining our findings.
(P6)
If the biblical account provides a better explanation of these facts than alternative accounts, then it is reasonable to accept it as the best explanation.
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This premise employs inference to the best explanation (abduction):
- We have certain phenomena: libertarian freedom, epistemic responsibility, rational thought.
- Different worldviews offer competing explanations.
- The worldview that best explains these phenomena is most likely true.
Criteria for best explanation include:
- Explanatory power: Does it actually explain the phenomenon?
- Explanatory scope: Does it explain related phenomena as well?
- Simplicity: Does it avoid ad hoc complications?
- Consistency: Does it cohere with other known truths?
If Christianity excels on these criteria, it's reasonable to accept it.
(C4)
Therefore, if the biblical account provides the best explanation, it is reasonable to accept it.
(From P5 and P6)
This moves us from the existence of God or God-like entities to the specific God of Scripture. Combined with other arguments (moral, cosmological, resurrection evidence), a cumulative case for Christianity emerges.
Stratton, Timothy A., and J. P. Moreland. "An Explanation and Defense of the Free-Thinking Argument." Religions 13, no. 10 (2022): 988. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel13100988
J. P. Moreland and William Lane Craig, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview, 2nd ed. Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2017.
Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.
Timothy Stratton, Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism: A Biblical and Philosophical Analysis. Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2020.
C. S. Lewis, Miracles. New York: HarperOne, 2001.
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We do not need libertarian free will for epistemic responsibility. Compatibilist freedom is sufficient. As long as you act according to your own desires and beliefs without external constraint, you are free and can be held responsible.
1. Compatibilism redefines freedom in a way that does not capture genuine epistemic responsibility.
Compatibilism says you are free if:
- You act according to your strongest desire.
- You are not externally coerced.
- Your actions flow from your character and values.
But this is compatible with your desires, character, and values being entirely determined by factors beyond your control:
- Genetic inheritance.
- Environmental conditioning.
- Brain chemistry.
- Prior physical states extending back before your birth.
Think about what this means for belief formation:
Suppose John believes naturalism because:
- He was raised in an atheist home (environmental conditioning).
- His brain chemistry makes him averse to religious ideas (genetic factors).
- His university professors reinforced naturalism (social pressure).
- All these factors determine his strongest desire: to believe naturalism.
On compatibilism, John "freely" believes naturalism because he acts on his strongest desire. But is he epistemically responsible?
- He never had the ability to desire differently given his past.
- He could not have investigated theistic arguments fairly because his determined psychology made him averse to them.
- His belief is the inevitable result of non-rational causes (genes, environment, chemistry), not a response to evidence.
This does not look like genuine epistemic responsibility.
2. Epistemic responsibility requires the ability to respond to reasons, not just act on desires.
Consider a key difference:
- Moral responsibility often concerns acting according to your values.
- Epistemic responsibility concerns forming beliefs according to evidence, even when this conflicts with desires.
Example:
- You desire to believe your spouse is faithful.
- But you encounter strong evidence of infidelity.
- Epistemic responsibility requires believing the evidence even though you desire otherwise.
On compatibilism:
- If your strongest desire is to believe your spouse is faithful, you will believe it.
- If environmental and genetic factors determine that desire to be strongest, you cannot believe otherwise.
- Your belief formation does not track evidence; it tracks determined desires.
Genuine epistemic responsibility requires:
- The power to override desires when evidence points elsewhere.
- Libertarian control to choose evidence over emotion.
3. The "could have done otherwise" requirement is not satisfied by compatibilism.
When we say someone "should have examined evidence more carefully," we imply:
- They could have done so (genuine ability).
- Nothing prevented them except their own choice.
But on compatibilism:
- Given their past (genes, environment, prior brain states), only one outcome was possible.
- They could not actually have examined evidence differently.
- Talk of "should have" is just expressing our preference, not stating a genuine obligation.
Philosopher Peter van Inwagen's consequence argument illustrates this:
- The laws of nature and the past are beyond your control.
- If determinism is true, your actions are the necessary consequences of laws and past.
- Therefore, your actions are beyond your control.
Applied to belief:
- If your beliefs are necessary consequences of factors beyond your control, you are not responsible for them.
- Compatibilist redefinition of "control" does not change this.
4. Frankfurt cases do not rescue compatibilism for epistemic responsibility.
Compatibilists sometimes point to Frankfurt-style cases: a person acts on their own desire, but an off-switch would have forced the same action if they had chosen otherwise. The person is still responsible, they say, because the off-switch never activated. Yet in epistemic contexts this fails. If the "off-switch" is deterministic brain chemistry that guarantees you believe naturalism, you never genuinely weighed evidence; the outcome was fixed. You remain a passive conduit, not an active rational agent.
5. The compatibilist response undermines the objector's own argument.
When a compatibilist argues against libertarian freedom:
- They present evidence and reasons.
- They expect you to weigh these reasons.
- They think you should believe their conclusion if the reasoning is sound.
But this presupposes:
- You can override your current beliefs based on reasons.
- You can choose to follow where logic leads.
- Evidence can causally influence your beliefs in a rational way, not just determined way.
Yet compatibilism (especially on naturalism) says:
- Your belief will be whatever your determined psychology produces.
- Evidence does not rationally cause belief formation; physical brain states do.
The compatibilist's own argumentative practice contradicts compatibilist metaphysics.
6. Compatibilism cannot account for intellectual virtues that require overriding determined inclinations.
Consider intellectual virtues:
- Overcoming confirmation bias.
- Considering views you find distasteful.
- Following evidence against your self-interest.
- Maintaining belief in truth despite social pressure.
These virtues require:
- Libertarian power to act against determined inclinations.
- On compatibilism, if your strongest desire (determined by genetics, environment) is to indulge confirmation bias, you cannot do otherwise.
- Intellectual virtue becomes impossible.
7. Historical philosophers recognized this problem.
David Hume, a compatibilist, honestly admitted:
"If voluntary actions be subjected to the same laws of necessity with the operations of matter, there is a continued chain of necessary causes, pre-ordained and pre-determined, reaching from the original cause of all to every single volition of every human creature. No contingency anywhere in the universe; no indifference; no liberty."
Hume's candor reveals the problem: compatibilism, especially on naturalism, reduces human thought to determined physical processes, eliminating genuine freedom.
8. The argument connects to Plantinga's EAAN.
Alvin Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism shows:
- On naturalism, evolution selects for survival, not truth.
- Our cognitive faculties are not designed to track truth but fitness.
- This gives us reason to doubt our beliefs, including belief in naturalism.
But notice: Plantinga's argument assumes we should care whether our beliefs track truth. This presupposes epistemic responsibility. But if compatibilism is true on naturalism, we cannot be responsible for whether our beliefs track truth or fitness, because:
- We cannot override evolutionary programming.
- We cannot choose truth over survival-oriented belief.
So compatibilism on naturalism is self-defeating.
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Neuroscience has shown that thoughts are nothing more than brain states. Every mental event has a neural correlate. We can even predict decisions before people are consciously aware of them (Libet experiments). This proves materialism is true and libertarian freedom is an illusion.
1. Correlation does not prove identity.
The fact that mental states correlate with brain states doesn't prove mental states are nothing but brain states:
- My hand waving correlates with my decision to wave.
- But my hand waving is not identical to my decision.
- Similarly, brain states correlating with thoughts doesn't prove thoughts are identical to brain states.
The correlation is perfectly compatible with substance dualism:
- An immaterial soul or mind.
- Interacting causally with the physical brain.
- Such that mental events produce neural events and vice versa.
Think of a piano player and piano:
- The music (mental) correlates perfectly with piano keys being struck (neural).
- But the music isn't identical to the piano mechanism.
- The pianist uses the piano as an instrument.
Similarly, the soul might use the brain as an instrument for thinking in embodied existence.
2. Neuroscience studies correlation, not causation or identity.
What neuroscience actually shows:
- Certain brain regions light up during certain mental activities.
- Damage to brain regions correlates with loss of mental functions.
- Brain stimulation can influence mental states.
What neuroscience doesn't show:
- That brain states cause mental states rather than vice versa.
- That mental states are nothing but brain states.
- That there's no immaterial aspect to the person.
Consider an analogy from Richard Swinburne:
Suppose we discovered that every time someone thinks about mathematics, a specific computer in another room shows activity. We might conclude:
- The computer activity correlates with math thinking.
- Perhaps there's a causal connection.
But this wouldn't prove:
- The person's thinking is identical to the computer activity.
- The person has no mind beyond the computer.
It might be that the person's thinking causes the computer activity, or that both are effects of a common cause, or various other relationships.
3. Libet-style experiments don't undermine libertarian freedom.
Benjamin Libet's experiments seem to show:
- Brain activity (readiness potential) precedes conscious awareness of deciding.
- Therefore, the brain decides before "you" do.
- Therefore, free will is an illusion.
But multiple problems plague this interpretation:
Problem 1: Libet himself didn't reject free will:
- He found subjects could still veto decisions after brain activity.
- He called this "free won't."
- This suggests conscious control remains possible.
Problem 2: The experiments involve extremely simple decisions:
- Flexing a wrist at some moment.
- Pressing a button.
These aren't the kind of complex rational deliberation the Free-Thinking Argument concerns:
- Weighing philosophical arguments.
- Assessing evidence for competing theories.
- Making considered judgments about truth.
Philosopher Richard Swinburne notes:
- Complex mental acts involve intricate interactions of beliefs, desires, intentions, and rational assessment.
- The simplistic tasks in Libet experiments provide poor analogy to these.
- Neuroscience will never discover deterministic brain correlates for such complex rational processes.
Problem 3: Substance dualism predicts time lags:
- If an immaterial soul forms an intention.
- This intention causes brain states.
- The brain states then produce conscious awareness of the intention.
- There would naturally be a time lag between intention and awareness.
So the temporal sequence in Libet experiments is compatible with libertarian freedom on substance dualism.
Problem 4: The objection is self-defeating:
- If all beliefs are determined by non-rational brain states, this includes the belief that "Libet experiments prove no free will."
- Why trust that belief if it's just neurons firing based on chemistry, not rational assessment of evidence?
4. Neuroscience presupposes what it tries to deny.
For neuroscience to work as an argument against freedom:
- Scientists must assess evidence rationally.
- They must choose theories based on which best fits data.
- They must assume their reasoning tracks truth, not just brain chemistry.
But if their conclusion is correct (no freedom, all thoughts determined), then:
- Their assessment of evidence wasn't rational but determined.
- Their choice of theory wasn't based on fit but brain states.
- Their reasoning doesn't track truth but chemical necessity.
This undermines confidence in their conclusion.
5. Mental properties are irreducible to physical properties.
Even granting brain-mind correlation, mental states have properties that physical states lack:
Intentionality:
- Mental states are about things (thoughts about Paris, beliefs about quarks).
- Physical states aren't intrinsically "about" anything.
- A pattern of neurons firing isn't intrinsically about anything; we interpret it that way.
Normativity:
- Beliefs can be true or false, justified or unjustified.
- Brain states are just there; they're not "true" or "false."
- You can't look at neurons and see truth value.
Qualia:
- The subjective feel of experiences (what it's like to see red).
- No amount of neuron-firing descriptions capture this first-person phenomenology.
First-person access:
- I know my thoughts directly, immediately.
- I don't infer my beliefs from observing my brain.
- Yet scientists must infer brain states from external observation.
These differences suggest mental states aren't identical to physical brain states.
6. The explanatory gap remains unbridged.
Even if we map every neural correlate of consciousness:
- We haven't explained why these neural patterns produce subjective experience.
- We haven't shown how physical processes generate rational thought.
- We haven't bridged the explanatory gap between matter and mind.
Philosopher David Chalmers calls this the "hard problem of consciousness." Neuroscience addresses the "easy problems":
- How does the brain process sensory information?
- How does it store memories?
- How does it coordinate motor control?
But not the hard problem:
- Why is there subjective experience at all?
- Why does rational thought emerge from matter?
The free-thinking argument addresses this: libertarian rational thought requires more than matter; it requires immaterial agents.
7. Theism accommodates neuroscience better than naturalism.
On theism with substance dualism:
- God creates embodied souls.
- The soul uses the brain as its instrument in this life.
- Brain-mind correlation is expected: the soul works through the brain.
- Brain damage affects mental function because the instrument is damaged.
This explains:
- Why neuroscience discovers correlations (the instrument matters).
- Why persons remain persons despite brain damage (the soul persists).
- Why rational thought transcends determined brain states (the soul as agent cause).
Naturalism explains the correlations but can't explain rational agency. Theism explains both.
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Evolution by natural selection explains why we have rational capacities and why they're generally reliable. Organisms with accurate beliefs about their environment survive better. No God or soul needed.
1. This is Alvin Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (EAAN) revisited.
Plantinga's argument shows that evolution actually undermines confidence in our cognitive faculties on naturalism:
The setup:
- Let R = "Our cognitive faculties are reliable."
- Let N = "Naturalism is true."
- Let E = "Our cognitive faculties arose by evolution."
Plantinga's claim:
- P(R|N&E) is low or inscrutable.
- That is: the probability that our faculties are reliable, given naturalism and evolution, is low or unknowable.
Why?
2. Evolution selects for survival, not truth.
Natural selection cares about one thing: reproductive success.
- Beliefs that aid survival are selected.
- Beliefs that hinder survival are eliminated.
But survival and truth can come apart:
Consider:
- A false belief that increases survival is favored over a true belief that decreases it.
- If believing your enemies are more dangerous than they are makes you more cautious and thus safer, that false belief is selected.
- If believing your food is less nutritious than it is makes you eat more and survive famine better, that false belief is selected.
Philosopher Patricia Churchland puts it bluntly:
"Boiled down to essentials, a nervous system enables the organism to succeed in the four F's: feeding, fleeing, fighting, and reproducing. The principal chore of nervous systems is to get the body parts where they should be in order that the organism may survive. Truth, whatever that is, definitely takes the hindmost."
3. Adaptive behavior doesn't require true beliefs.
Plantinga shows that evolution could produce adaptive behavior through various combinations:
- True beliefs with desires aimed at survival.
- False beliefs with bizarre desires that cancel out, producing adaptive behavior.
- No beliefs at all, just hardwired behavioral responses.
Example:
- Paul wants to be eaten by tigers (bizarre desire).
- Paul believes running away from tigers will result in being eaten (false belief).
- Result: Paul runs from tigers (adaptive behavior).
This behavior is just as fit as:
- Paul wants to survive (normal desire).
- Paul believes tigers are dangerous (true belief).
- Result: Paul runs from tigers (adaptive behavior).
Since both produce equal fitness, evolution can't distinguish between them. Therefore, evolution doesn't select for true beliefs specifically.
4. The content of beliefs is epiphenomenal on naturalism.
On naturalism:
- Mental states (including beliefs) are either identical to brain states or dependent on them.
- Evolution selects brain states based on their causal effects on behavior.
- The semantic content of beliefs (what they're about, whether they're true) is irrelevant to evolution.
Think of it this way:
- Evolution "sees" only: Does this brain state cause adaptive behavior?
- It doesn't "see": Does this belief state represent truth?
So even if beliefs happen to be true on naturalism, it's by accident, not by evolutionary design.
5. Cognitive faculties aimed at abstract truth are especially problematic.
Even if evolution might select for reliable perception and basic reasoning:
- These concern immediate survival-relevant matters (finding food, avoiding predators).
But what about:
- Abstract reasoning (philosophy, mathematics, logic).
- Theoretical science (quantum mechanics, cosmology).
- Metaphysical inquiry (does God exist? is naturalism true?).
Evolution provides no explanation for why we'd have reliable faculties for these domains:
- They don't affect survival on the African savannah.
- Abstract truth-seeking often conflicts with survival (martyrdom for truth, spending resources on pure research).
Yet we trust our reasoning in these areas. Why, if evolution didn't design it for truth in these domains?
6. The defeater problem arises.
Plantinga argues:
- If you believe N&E (naturalism and evolution).
- And you see that P(R|N&E) is low or inscrutable.
- Then you have a defeater for R (a reason to doubt your faculties are reliable).
But if you have a defeater for R:
- You have a defeater for every belief produced by those faculties.
- Including your belief in N&E itself.
So belief in N&E is self-defeating:
- It gives you reason to doubt your cognitive faculties.
- But you used those faculties to believe N&E.
- So you've undercut your own grounds for believing N&E.
7. The objection confuses causal explanation with rational justification.
The evolutionary story might explain:
- How we came to have cognitive faculties (causal history).
- Why we have certain belief-forming mechanisms (adaptive value).
But it doesn't explain:
- Why we should trust those faculties to track truth rather than mere fitness.
- How we're justified in believing their outputs correspond to reality.
This is the difference between:
- Explaining the origin of beliefs (psychology, neuroscience, evolution).
- Justifying that beliefs are likely true (epistemology, rational warrant).
Evolution addresses origin, not justification.
8. Theism solves the problem evolution creates.
On theism:
- God creates human cognitive faculties.
- He designs them to track truth, not just fitness.
- Our faculties are aimed at truth because a rational God made them.
This explains:
- Why we trust our rational capacities.
- Why they're reliable in abstract domains (God intended this).
- Why truth and fitness often align (God designed for both).
So the appeal to evolution backfires: it actually supports the free-thinking argument by showing naturalism undermines confidence in reason, while theism grounds it.
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Even on naturalism, we can ground epistemic norms and responsibility pragmatically. Beliefs that track truth tend to be more useful. We can talk about epistemic responsibility in terms of reliable belief-forming processes without invoking libertarian freedom.
1. Pragmatic accounts confuse utility with truth.
The objection says:
- Beliefs that track truth are useful.
- Therefore, we have pragmatic grounds to prefer truth-tracking beliefs.
But this conflates two different things:
- Whether a belief is true (corresponds to reality).
- Whether believing something is useful (has good consequences).
These can come apart:
Consider:
- It might be useful to believe I'm healthy (reduces stress, improves mental state).
- But this belief could be false (I might have undiagnosed cancer).
Or:
- It might be useful for society if everyone believed in objective moral values.
- But on naturalism, this belief is arguably false (no objective morality exists).
So usefulness doesn't establish truth. Pragmatic grounding fails to give us epistemic justification, only practical benefits of certain beliefs.
2. This reduces "ought" to "is useful," eliminating genuine normativity.
When we say "you ought to believe based on evidence":
- We don't mean merely "it would be useful if you did."
- We mean you have a genuine obligation, independent of usefulness.
Consider:
- You ought to believe the evidence even if it's inconvenient.
- You ought to follow logic even if the conclusion is uncomfortable.
- You ought to be intellectually honest even if dishonesty benefits you.
These normative oughts can't be reduced to pragmatic utility:
- Sometimes truth-seeking is costly, not useful.
- Sometimes epistemic responsibility conflicts with self-interest.
On naturalism with pragmatic grounding:
- There's no genuine "ought," only "it would be useful."
- But then epistemic norms lose their obligatory force.
3. Reliable processes don't ground responsibility without libertarian control.
The objection mentions "reliable belief-forming processes" as a naturalistic ground for epistemic norms. This is called reliabilism in epistemology.
But reliabilism without libertarian freedom faces problems:
Consider a reliable thermometer:
- It produces true temperature readings consistently.
- It's a reliable process.
- But the thermometer isn't responsible for its readings.
Why not? Because it has no control:
- It couldn't have done otherwise.
- It's not an agent that chooses how to respond.
Similarly, on naturalism:
- Your belief-forming processes are like the thermometer.
- They reliably produce beliefs based on inputs and prior states.
- But you're not responsible because you have no libertarian control.
Reliability without agency doesn't ground responsibility.
4. The objection can't account for intellectual virtue and vice.
We praise people for intellectual virtues:
- Open-mindedness, intellectual courage, fair-mindedness, thoroughness.
We blame people for intellectual vices:
- Close-mindedness, intellectual cowardice, confirmation bias, sloppy thinking.
But these presuppose libertarian freedom:
- Virtues require the ability to overcome biased inclinations.
- Vices involve failures to exercise control you have.
On naturalism with determined processes:
- If your brain states make you close-minded, you can't be otherwise.
- Calling it a "vice" is just expressing disapproval, not genuine blame.
Pragmatic naturalism can't preserve the category of intellectual virtue and vice.
5. The objection presupposes what it denies.
Notice what the objection does:
- Presents arguments for naturalism.
- Expects you to evaluate those arguments.
- Thinks you should believe naturalism if the arguments are sound.
But this presupposes:
- You can assess arguments based on their merit.
- You can choose to believe based on reasons rather than non-rational causes.
- You have epistemic responsibility to follow where evidence leads.
Yet naturalism with determined processes denies this:
- Your beliefs are whatever your brain produces based on prior states.
- You don't "choose" based on reasons; reasons are epiphenomenal labels for brain states.
The practice contradicts the theory.
6. Pragmatic grounding is arbitrary without objective truth.
Why should truth-tracking be pragmatically valuable?
- On naturalism, the universe doesn't care about truth or falsehood.
- Natural selection cares about survival, and false beliefs can be adaptive.
- So why think truth-tracking is ultimately useful?
The answer might be: "It helps us survive and flourish."
But this answer presupposes:
- Survival and flourishing are valuable (a normative claim).
- On naturalism, where do these values come from?
We're back to needing objective moral or epistemic values, which naturalism can't provide.
7. First-person deliberation shows genuine responsibility, not just reliable processes.
When you deliberate about what to believe:
- You experience yourself as weighing reasons.
- You feel the normative force of evidence.
- You take responsibility for your conclusion.
This first-person phenomenology doesn't fit the naturalistic picture:
- On naturalism, you're not weighing reasons; brain states are evolving.
- Evidence doesn't exert normative force; physical causes produce effects.
- You don't take responsibility; you observe results of determined processes.
The mismatch between lived experience and naturalistic theory suggests naturalism is false.
8. Theism provides what naturalism lacks.
On theism:
- Epistemic norms are grounded in God's rational nature and commands.
- We have genuine responsibility because God gave us libertarian freedom.
- Truth matters because God is truth and designed us to know Him and His creation.
- Intellectual virtues reflect God's character (wisdom, honesty, fairness).
This provides:
- Objective epistemic norms (not just pragmatic utility).
- Genuine responsibility (grounded in libertarian freedom).
- Rational confidence (God designed faculties for truth).
Naturalism offers pragmatic substitutes; theism offers the real thing.
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Quantum mechanics shows that the universe isn't deterministic. Quantum indeterminacy at the micro-level could allow for libertarian freedom without requiring God or immaterial souls.
1. Indeterminism doesn't equal freedom.
The objection confuses two distinct concepts:
- Determinism vs. indeterminism (whether events have sufficient prior causes).
- Freedom vs. unfreedom (whether agents have control over their actions).
Libertarian freedom requires more than mere indeterminism:
- Not just: events aren't determined by prior causes.
- But: agents act as first causes with control over outcomes.
Quantum indeterminacy gives us randomness, not agency.
2. Random quantum events don't provide the right kind of freedom.
Suppose quantum randomness influences brain processes:
- At the moment of decision, a quantum event occurs randomly.
- This randomness affects which belief you form.
Problems:
Problem 1: Randomness isn't control:
- You don't control random quantum events.
- If they affect your thinking, your thoughts are random, not freely chosen.
- This is no better for responsibility than determinism.
Think of analogies:
- Suppose your beliefs were determined by coin flips. Are you responsible?
- Suppose your reasoning was affected by radioactive decay (truly random). Are you responsible?
- Obviously not in either case.
Quantum randomness in thought processes would similarly eliminate responsibility, not enable it.
Problem 2: Agency requires more than gaps in determinism:
- Libertarian freedom needs substance (a person as agent).
- It needs active power (ability to originate action).
- It needs final causation (acting for reasons).
Quantum indeterminacy provides none of these:
- No substance, just probabilistic events.
- No active power, just random occurrences.
- No teleology, just chance.
3. The argument never claimed determinism alone refutes libertarian freedom.
Notice the structure of the free-thinking argument:
- It doesn't say: "Determinism is true, therefore no libertarian freedom."
- It says: "On naturalism (no God, no souls), there's no libertarian freedom."
Why? Because naturalism lacks:
- Substances that can be agents (only physical processes exist).
- Agent causation (only event-event causation exists).
- Teleology and normativity (only blind physical causes exist).
Adding quantum randomness to naturalism doesn't solve these problems:
- Still no substantial souls or immaterial agents.
- Still no agent causation.
- Still no genuine teleology.
4. Quantum mechanics doesn't scale up to the level of human cognition.
Even granting quantum indeterminacy at micro-levels:
- Most physicists think macroscopic phenomena (including brain processes) are effectively deterministic.
- Quantum effects "average out" at larger scales.
- Neural firing patterns follow classical physics well enough for deterministic behavior.
Physicist Max Tegmark calculated:
- Quantum coherence in the brain lasts only 10^-13 seconds.
- Far too short to influence neural processing meaningfully.
- Brain states are effectively determined by classical physics.
So appealing to quantum mechanics doesn't help naturalism accommodate libertarian freedom.
5. The objection doesn't address the core issue: agent causation.
Recall what libertarian freedom requires:
- A person as substance (not just a stream of events).
- Acting as an unmoved mover or first cause.
- Originating actions rather than merely channeling causes.
Thomas Aquinas explained:
- In a causal series of movers, only the first mover is truly responsible.
- Intermediate movers just passively receive and transfer motion.
On naturalism, even with quantum indeterminacy:
- There are no persons as substances, only physical processes.
- There's no first mover, only events causing events (or occurring randomly).
- Persons are theaters where events happen, not agents who act.
Quantum mechanics doesn't change this naturalistic picture.
6. If quantum randomness influenced thinking, rationality would be undermined.
Suppose quantum events genuinely affected belief formation:
- Your conclusion to an argument might depend on random quantum fluctuations.
- Different quantum outcomes would produce different beliefs.
- Your reasoning wouldn't track truth or logic but quantum chance.
This would:
- Undermine trust in our reasoning (it's partly random).
- Eliminate rational responsibility (you're a victim of quantum dice).
- Make science impossible (experimental results influenced by experimenter's random brain states).
So quantum indeterminacy in cognition is epistemically disastrous.
7. The objection misunderstands what naturalism entails.
Naturalism is committed to:
- No entities beyond the natural world (space-time, matter, energy, laws).
- No immaterial souls or minds.
- No supernatural intervention or top-down causation.
Quantum indeterminacy, even if real:
- Is still a feature of the natural world.
- Doesn't introduce souls or immaterial agents.
- Doesn't provide agent causation or libertarian freedom.
Randomness within nature isn't less naturalistic than determinism within nature. Both are purely physical accounts. Neither grounds libertarian freedom.
8. Theism provides what quantum mechanics cannot.
On theism with substance dualism:
- Persons are embodied souls (substances, not just physical processes).
- Souls can act as first causes (unmoved movers).
- Mental causation is top-down (soul acts on body), not just bottom-up (brain states cause mental states).
- Rational thought tracks reasons and truth, not just physical or quantum causes.
This explains:
- Genuine libertarian freedom (souls as agents).
- Epistemic responsibility (control over belief formation).
- Reliable reasoning (designed for truth, not random).
Quantum mechanics is irrelevant. The real issue is whether persons are mere physical systems or immaterial agents. Theism affirms the latter; naturalism denies it.
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Even if the argument succeeds in refuting naturalism and establishing that God or something like God exists, it doesn't prove Christianity is true. Maybe it's deism, or some other form of theism, or perhaps even something like Hinduism or Buddhism.
1. This is correct, and the argument doesn't claim otherwise.
The Free-Thinking Argument has a limited scope:
- It aims to refute robust naturalism.
- It aims to establish that God or things like God exist.
- It doesn't, by itself, establish Christianity.
This is appropriate for a philosophical argument. Natural theology typically:
- Establishes theism (a necessary first step).
- Then combines with historical, moral, and revelational evidence.
- To arrive at a specific religious tradition.
As C.S. Lewis put it: philosophical arguments get us to belief in God; historical evidence gets us to Christianity.
2. But the argument has important implications that narrow the field.
What the argument establishes:
First, reality includes more than the physical:
- Immaterial minds or souls exist.
- This rules out strict materialism and physicalism.
Second, humans have libertarian freedom:
- We're not determined machines.
- We have genuine agency and control.
- This has moral and metaphysical significance.
Third, rational thought requires a non-naturalistic foundation:
- Our cognitive faculties are designed for truth.
- This suggests purposive design by an intelligent creator.
These conclusions are highly compatible with Christianity and less compatible with many alternatives:
- Deism: Possible but doesn't explain ongoing providence or why God would create rational free creatures.
- Pantheism: Struggles with personal agency and freedom (if all is one impersonal substance).
- Buddhism (traditional): Denies substantial self, which contradicts the argument's commitment to persons as substances.
- Hinduism (Advaita): Ultimate reality is impersonal Brahman, which doesn't ground personal freedom well.
3. Christianity offers specific resources the argument requires.
The Free-Thinking Argument needs:
Need 1: A personal, rational God.
- Christianity: God is maximally rational, "the Logos."
- This grounds objective truth and rational order.
Need 2: Humans as embodied souls with libertarian freedom.
- Christianity: Humans created in God's image.
- Genesis 1:26-27: image includes rationality and moral agency.
- This explains our capacity for genuine thought and choice.
Need 3: Reliable cognitive faculties aimed at truth.
- Christianity: God designed human faculties to know Him and His creation.
- Proverbs 2:6: "The LORD gives wisdom; from his mouth come knowledge and understanding."
- This grounds confidence that our reasoning can track truth.
Need 4: Moral and epistemic responsibility.
- Christianity: Humans accountable to God for beliefs and actions.
- Scripture commands belief (John 20:31; Romans 10:9).
- This makes sense of genuine epistemic responsibility.
4. Christianity's historical claims provide additional support.
Once natural theology establishes:
- God exists.
- Humans have souls and freedom.
- Our faculties can track truth.
We can then investigate historical claims:
- Did Jesus rise from the dead?
- Are there fulfilled prophecies?
- Is biblical testimony reliable?
These historical arguments, combined with philosophical ones, build a cumulative case for Christianity specifically.
5. The argument combines with other theistic arguments.
The Free-Thinking Argument is one piece of a larger puzzle:
From the Kalam Cosmological Argument:
- A personal Creator brought the universe into being.
From the Fine-Tuning Argument:
- The universe is precisely calibrated for life.
From the Moral Argument:
- Objective moral values require a perfectly good God.
From the Free-Thinking Argument:
- Libertarian freedom requires immaterial souls and a rational Creator.
Combined, these point toward:
- A personal, powerful, intelligent, good, rational God.
- Who creates rational, free creatures in His image.
- Who designs the cosmos with purpose.
This cumulative case strongly resembles the God of classical theism and Christianity.
6. The biblical worldview is a live candidate for best explanation.
Premise P5 states:
- The biblical account explains God's existence, libertarian freedom, and epistemic responsibility.
Premise P6 states:
- If it's the best explanation, we should accept it.
Christianity offers:
- Explanatory power: Accounts for all the phenomena.
- Explanatory scope: Also explains morality, meaning, purpose, fine-tuning, beginning of universe, etc.
- Simplicity: One ultimate personal God explains multiple phenomena.
- Historical evidence: Resurrection, fulfilled prophecy, transformation of disciples.
When compared to alternatives (deism, eastern religions, naturalism), Christianity arguably provides the most comprehensive and satisfying explanation.
7. The argument establishes a framework requiring further investigation.
The modest conclusion:
- Naturalism is false.
- Some form of theism or dualism is true.
- We need libertarian freedom and rational minds.
The invitation:
- Which worldview best explains these findings?
- Christianity is a strong candidate.
- Investigate its historical and philosophical claims further.
The Free-Thinking Argument doesn't end the conversation; it frames it rightly:
- Not "Is any form of theism true?" (yes).
- But "Which form of theism is true?" (Christianity is strongly competitive).
8. Even modest theism defeats naturalistic atheism.
The primary target of the argument is naturalism:
- The dominant worldview in contemporary Western academia.
- The foundation of most atheistic positions.
If the argument succeeds:
- Naturalistic atheism is refuted.
- Some form of theism or supernaturalism is established.
- This is philosophically significant even before identifying which theism.
From there, additional evidence (historical, moral, experiential) can guide toward Christianity specifically.
See also:
• Natural Theology: Kalam Cosmological Argument
• Natural Theology: Fine-Tuning Argument
• Natural Theology: Moral Argument
• CE / Resurrection: Maximal Data Method
